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The euro area economy is moving in dangerous 
territory. The sovereign debt crisis has now 
reached a new, contagious quality – deep losses 
of confidence and extreme risk aversion are 
driving up yields, ipso facto threatening the 
sustainability of previously manageable debt 
burdens. Given the considerable policy efforts 
already undertaken at the national and EU level, 
room for policy manoeuvre is becoming more 
limited just as market tensions are mounting 
further. The sheer speed of the deterioration is 
placing heavy demands on national governments 
and the euro area as a whole, as well as on all 
other stakeholders.  
The European response to the crisis cannot 
afford itself the luxury of focusing purely on 
immediate challenges, for instance those 
transmitted by financial markets. Policy action 
must involve both 'fire-fighting' as well as 
medium term reforms to secure growth and debt 
sustainability if confidence in the euro area is to 
be reinvigorated. At a national level, new 
political impulses can give a decisive impetus 
for the required fiscal consolidation and growth-
boosting reforms. At the euro area and EU level, 
the recent December European Council has 
resulted in an agreement among euro-area 
Member States on the way forward, which will 
be further bolstered through the participation of 
many other EU Member States as well.  
The achievements of the European Council 
meeting on 9 December reflect shared economic 
interests and will complement national policy 
efforts in a number of ways. The way to a fiscal 
stability union is now paved, with a new fiscal 
rule at its heart. Government budgets shall in 
future be balanced or in surplus, and this 
requirement will also be transposed into national 
legislation. An additional strengthening of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure will guide Member 
States' progress towards the steady state of 
sustainable and balanced budgets. Furthermore, 
in future all major economic policy reforms 
planned by euro-area Members will be jointly 
discussed and coordinated so as to establish 
benchmarks for best practice. Heads of State or 
Government also agreed to strengthen the 
stabilisation tools by confirming the rapid 
deployment of the two options for the leveraging 
of the EFSF and by accelerating the entry into 
force of the ESM (July 2012 instead of mid-
2013), while also making its governance more 
flexible. During the period of coexistence of the 
EFSF and ESM (until mid-2013), a combined 
effective lending capacity of EUR 500bn will be 
ensured. The adequacy of the overall EFSF/ESM 
ceiling will be reassessed in March 2012. 
Through this array of policy actions the summit 
added further momentum to the overhaul of 
economic and fiscal coordination and 
surveillance, which the wide-ranging legislative 
changes embodied in the 'six-pack', i.e. the 
economic governance reform package that came 
into effect on 13 December, had set in motion. 
Two draft regulatory proposals by the 
Commission published on 23 November aim to 
strengthen the six-pack reforms further. The first 
proposal reinforces the surveillance of countries 
receiving financial assistance via the EFSF and 
ESM and of those at serious risk of financial 
instability, while the other provides for deeper 
fiscal surveillance of euro-area Member States – 
including the advance examination of national 
budgets – and for systematic in-year budgetary 
monitoring of countries in excessive deficit 
procedure. 
Rarely have economic governance and 
macroeconomic prospects in the euro area been 
more closely intertwined that at the current 
juncture. Over the past six months, the outlook 
for the EU and the euro area has deteriorated. 
The recovery of the EU economy has come to a 
standstill. The Commission's Autumn 2011 
forecast, published on 10 November, shows that 
the protracted sovereign-debt crisis has taken its 
toll on confidence in the euro area and beyond, 
thus harming investment and consumption. 
Furthermore, a significant loss of global growth 
momentum is weighing on prospects for exports. 
The first signs of improvements for GDP are 
projected for the second half of 2012, however, 
with very limited impact on job creation.  
Moving to a more robust economic governance 
framework in the euro area will be essential to 
resolving the debt crisis and can thereby rebuild 
confidence. The policy measures decided over 
the past months are expected to be effective in 
reducing the uncertainty related to the sovereign-
debt and financial-market crisis towards mid-
2012, and this will gradually release deferred 
investment and consumption. Annual GDP 
growth in 2012 is forecast at 0.5% in the euro 
area, and will remain lacklustre in 2013 at 1.3%. 
No Member State will escape the expected 
slowdown, while growth differences will persist. 
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Any slippage in implementing the 
aforementioned reform measures could pose a 
significant downside risk to this central outlook.  
The extent to which growth can be revived over 
the medium term will depend crucially on 
productivity developments in Member States. 
There is increasing evidence that total factor 
productivity (TFP) is a major explanatory factor 
for growth divergences within the euro area. 
This Quarterly Report investigates TFP 
determinants in depth. The focus section looks 
into the TFP deceleration in the euro area since 
the mid-1990's and the role it has played in 
influencing overall euro-area potential growth 
rates over this period. By explicitly accounting 
for skills as well as innovation capital, the 
section presents a model to gain greater insights 
into the determinants of euro-area TFP 
performance. From a policy perspective, the 
upshot of this analysis is that improving TFP 
performance is critical in lifting the euro area out 
of the crisis and allowing the necessary balance 
sheet adjustment to be less painful. 
Further special topics in this edition are devoted 
to themes surrounding the economic outlook. 
Our first contribution aims to provide a better 
understanding of recent developments in the 
euro-area household savings rate, concluding 
that current aggregate saving levels in the euro 
area are broadly consistent with fundamentals. 
The household saving rate has been mostly on a 
downward trend since the trough of the recession 
in 2009Q2 and, despite a recent pick up, remains 
comparatively low and thereby supportive of 
spending. Recent house price falls are found to 
actually lead to a decrease in savings via the 
'downpayment channel', which in combination 
with the limited importance of equities in 
household wealth and low interest rates explains 
the broad fall in savings in the recovery. 
Looking forward, however, more restrictive 
lending practices by banks could affect savings 
by restricting consumer credit and mortgages. 
Finally, recent losses in consumer confidence 
could also pave the way for a temporary rise in 
precautionary savings. 
 
 
 
 
We further turn to inflation developments, where 
consumer prices over the course of 2011 have 
displayed considerable volatility. Our second 
special topic aims to assess the contributing 
factors to this year's consumer price inflation, 
examining in particular the pivotal role of energy 
and other commodity prices. Furthermore, the 
section reviews the effect of methodological 
changes to the measurement of the harmonised 
consumer price index (HICP) as well as labour 
cost developments and recent signals from 
survey- and market-based inflation expectations.  
A final topic looks beyond our Member States to 
emerging market economies, which have proven 
rather resilient during the great recession. 
Although emerging market economies are likely 
to experience higher trend growth than their 
developed counterparts, a major downturn or an 
outright recession in advanced countries is likely 
to have a detrimental impact on growth in 
emerging market economies, given underlying 
globalisation trends. The empirical evidence 
presented in this section rejects to a large extent 
a 'cyclical decoupling' hypothesis, especially 
with regard to recessionary periods. Business 
cycle spillovers may occur via various channels, 
including trade, financial linkages, and 
confidence. Furthermore, banking sector 
linkages are considerable between emerging and 
advanced economies. This is especially the case 
in (non-euro area) Eastern Europe, which would 
be threatened in the case of a major cross-border 
retrenchment of foreign banks seeking to 
improve balance sheets. Beside traditional trade 
linkages, confidence spillovers appear to 
increasingly act as a force for business cycle co-
movement between advanced and emerging 
economies. 
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This focus section looks into the deceleration of 
total factor productivity (TFP) in the euro area 
since the mid-1990s and the role it has played in 
influencing overall euro-area potential growth 
rates over this period. The sharp reversal in euro-
area TFP fortunes over the last 15-20 years is in 
marked contrast to equivalent US trends. It is 
particularly worrying given the crucial role of 
TFP in driving sustainable per capita income 
trends, but also in the light of the likely impact of 
the financial crisis on potential output and of the 
economic ‘headwinds’ emanating from an ageing 
population structure. 
Tackling the deceleration in TFP growth is at the 
top of the agenda for policy makers in the euro 
area. This does, however, require a deeper 
understanding of its main causes. This focus 
section offers new empirical insights into the key 
knowledge determinants of TFP. Its main aim is 
to assess the extent to which overall trends in TFP 
can be explained by factors such as the skill 
composition of the labour force and trends in 
domestic and foreign knowledge capital stocks. 
I.1.  Recent developments in potential 
growth 
Any meaningful analysis of cyclical 
developments, of medium-term growth prospects 
or of the stance of fiscal and monetary policies is 
predicated on either an implicit or an explicit 
assumption concerning the rate of potential output 
growth. Such pervasive usage in the policy arena 
reflects the fact that potential output constitutes 
the best composite indicator of the aggregate 
supply-side capacity of an economy and of its 
scope for sustainable, non-inflationary growth. 
In the production function (PF) framework used in 
this section, potential output is estimated by 
combining the inputs of labour, capital and 
TFP. (1) Whilst the primary focus is on deepening 
our understanding of TFP trends, it is important to 
place these trends in the wider perspective 
provided by overall potential growth rate 
developments. The remainder of this introductory 
section draws on Graph I.1 to identify some 
important stylised facts regarding overall potential 
growth and its underlying determinants over the 
last few decades. It first looks at trends in the pre-
crisis period and then discusses the impact (so far) 
of the crisis on potential. 
Pre-crisis trends in potential growth 
When we examine potential growth rate 
developments in the euro area and the US in the 
decades leading up to the crisis, a number of key 
facts emerge: 
• Firstly, the US has clearly had higher potential 
growth over the period considered (1983-
2007), with rates of growth of 3 % compared 
with 2¼ % in the euro area and this growth rate 
differential expanding to a full percentage 
point over the period 1995-2007. (2) 
• Secondly, there have been dramatic shifts in 
the contributions to growth from labour, 
capital and TFP in both regions over the period  
                                                        
(1) See Solow, R.M. (1957), ‘Technical change and the 
aggregate production function’, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 39, No 3, pp. 312-320. 
(2) Growth rates refer to aggregate potential. When population 
dynamics are taken into account, GDP per capita income 
trends in the US and the euro area have been broadly 
comparable in recent decades. 
Over the past 15-20 years, the euro area’s productivity record has been hampered by a significant deceleration 
in the growth of total factor productivity (TFP). In the long run, TFP is the main driver of income per capita. 
The decelerating trend is all the more worrying given that the euro area is facing a number of serious medium- 
to long-term growth challenges, including population ageing and the negative effect of the crisis on potential 
output. Tackling the deceleration in TFP growth requires a good understanding of its main causes. This focus 
section offers new empirical insights into the key knowledge determinants of TFP. It shows that a significant 
part of the deceleration of trend TFP in euro-area Member States can be explained by changes in the skill 
composition of the labour force as well as by trends in domestic and foreign knowledge capital stocks. In 
particular, most Member States show a declining contribution from skill improvements to TFP. In many euro-
area Member States, the contribution of knowledge capital to TFP has been depressed by adverse trends in 
domestic knowledge investment. Finally, the analysis also shows the importance of cross-border knowledge 
spillovers. Slower accumulation of knowledge capital at the world level, reflecting in particular a slowdown in 
US R&D efforts, has weighed on TFP growth in the euro area. 
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1983-2010. Whilst the US outperformance 
over the first half of the period was driven by 
more favourable labour input trends, over the 
second part it was labour productivity 
developments that were the key driver, with 
US investment spending (relative to labour 
input growth) and TFP trends easily 
outperforming those of the euro area. (3) 
• Regarding labour market developments, the 
US outperformance for 1983-1994 was 
striking, with a contribution to overall 
potential growth of 1.1 % pp compared with 
0.2 % pp for the euro area. This US 
performance was driven by much stronger 
demographic developments (also owing to 
higher inward migration), by lower rates of 
structural unemployment and by substantially 
higher labour force participation rates. 
Differences with the US in the contribution of 
labour have, however, been significantly 
reduced since the mid-1990s, with a number of 
euro-area Member States pursuing significant 
labour market reforms that have resulted in 
both reduced rates of structural 
unemployment, especially in the post-2000 
period, and a large increase (i.e. of the order of 
                                                        
(3) Van Ark, B., M. O’Mahony and M. Timmer (2008), ‘The 
productivity gap between Europe and the US: Trends and 
causes’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 22, No 1, 
pp. 25-44. 
6 % pp) in participation rates to levels close to 
those of the US. 
• Regarding labour productivity trends, whilst 
US/euro-area growth differentials were 
generally small for the period 1983-2007 as a 
whole, this relatively reassuring picture 
evaporates when one looks at the development 
of productivity over the second half of this 
period, i.e. 1995-2007. Since the mid-1990s, 
the US has experienced substantially higher 
contributions to growth from both total 
investment spending and TFP. As shown in 
Graph I.1, the deterioration in the euro area’s 
productivity performance was not due to the 
contribution from capital accumulation, which 
remained remarkably stable over the period as 
a whole. The deterioration reflected a sharp 
downward movement in TFP growth rates, 
from a situation where the euro area was 
outperforming the US by close to half a 
percentage point, on an annual average basis, 
to the exact opposite situation where the euro 
area was experiencing TFP growth rates that 
were half a percentage point lower. 
Impact of the financial crisis 
A review of the literature on past financial crises, 
including the experiences of countries such as 
Finland, Sweden and Japan in the early 1990s, 
points to a number of important influences on the 
development of the different components of  
Graph I.1: Comparison of euro-area and US potential growth rates and determinants  
(annual growth rates in %, 1983-2010) 
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Box I.1: Knowledge as a source of growth
Standard growth models emphasise the role of physical capital and total factor productivity (TFP) as sources of 
growth. In fact TFP has always been regarded as the fundamental driver of growth and essentially the only 
determinant of long term per capita GDP growth (see, for example Solow (1957). Unfortunately, TFP was a black 
box and its determinants not further specified. This picture has changed with contributions from Romer (1986 and 
1990), Lucas (1998), Aghion (2006), Jones (1995a and 1995b) and others who have introduced new growth 
enhancing factors, in particular knowledge creation, into growth models.  
There are various ways in which one can look at knowledge creation. Broadly one can distinguish models which 
emphasise human capital formation or skill upgrading in the form of time spent on education and training (e.g. 
Lucas), whilst other models directly focus on R&D investment. The former approach models knowledge as a human 
capital formation problem at the household level whilst the latter approach emphasises knowledge investment 
decisions at the firm level. Both approaches are complementary and only focus on different aspects of knowledge 
creation. This explains the focus of the empirical analysis presented in this section on both skills and R&D. 
By linking TFP to knowledge investment, these models opened the way to also empirically assessing knowledge as a 
source of growth. However, alternative models make radically different predictions about the impact of knowledge 
inputs on growth. In particular early generations of endogenous growth models (e.g. Romer) predicted a link between 
a (permanent) change in the level of knowledge inputs and the (long-run) growth rate of productivity, whilst later 
vintages of growth models (the so called semi-endogenous growth models) pioneered by Jones, for example, predict 
that changes in the level of knowledge will only lead to temporary (albeit rather persistent) growth effects, with the 
economy eventually settling down at a permanently higher level of productivity.  
Consequently, the endogenous and semi-endogenous views on the impact of knowledge inputs have obviously 
drastically different growth implications. Whilst the endogenous view is optimistic concerning the impact of 
knowledge on generating growth, the semi-endogenous view arrives at the conclusion that only rising knowledge 
efforts can sustain past growth rates of productivity. Potentially the semi-endogenous growth view could explain why 
productivity in the EU has a tendency to decline despite either constant R&D shares or increasing efforts to lift the 
level of education. This view is also consistent with the observation that fairly constant growth in productivity over 
more than a century in the US is associated with ever increasing shares of knowledge inputs (see Jones (2002)). 
Eventually the decision as to which model is correct is an empirical matter and one has to look at the crucial 
parameters which determine the growth dynamics. In fact, the crucial parameters that have been identified by growth 
economists are values for the output elasticity of physical capital (in models focussing on education) and parameters 
determining the elasticity of R&D in the creation of knowledge. Consider for example the effects of skill upgrading 
in an otherwise standard neoclassical production function : 
(1) ( ) 0,0,1 >>≤= θβαθβα withAHLKY ttttt          
where Y, K, L and A denote GDP, capital, physical labour and TFP respectively and where H is a human capital or 
skill index. Assume the skill index is increased by x%. This leads to a direct increase of Y by %* xβ  but it will 
also have sustained second round effects, since it increases the marginal product of capital (MPK), which leads to 
higher physical capital. Notice, however, that this can only set in motion a sustained increase in the growth of GDP if 
the increase of capital does not lead to a decline in MPK i.e. only in the borderline case 1=α . For all other 
parameter values, growth will eventually level off and the long run output multiplier is given by: 
(2)  
α
β
−
=
1dh
dy   
where dy and dh are % changes in Y and H respectively. Empirical estimates for the output elasticity of capital (α ) 
(from growth regressions) clearly support the view that α  is well below one, supporting the more pessimistic view.  
Similar considerations apply to models that stress R&D as a source of growth and consider TFP as being proportional 
to a knowledge capital stock which is produced with R&D inputs/labour (LA) via the following knowledge 
production function:  
(3) ρφ ttt LAAA 1−=∆       with   0,1 >≤ ρφ  
 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Box (continued) 
 
For this model too, it can be shown that only if 1=φ , will a level shift in R&D inputs lead to a sustained increase in 
the growth rate of knowledge/TFP, while for all other parameter values a permanent increase in the level of R&D will 
only increase the level of TFP, with : 
(4)  
φ
ρ
−
=
1dla
da   
Also in the case of knowledge production functions, the empirical evidence points in the direction of 1<φ  (Bottazzi 
& Peri 2003, Jones 1995a & 1995b), i.e. decreasing returns from new knowledge with respect to existing knowledge. 
The empirical analysis from which the results in this focus section are derived follows the semi endogenous 
paradigm, i.e. the standard specification of capital in the production function is retained by imposing an output 
elasticity of capital which is close to one minus the wage share. A knowledge accumulation equation is estimated 
which imposes the constraint that level shifts in R&D inputs only lead to long run level shifts of output. In addition, a 
distinction is made between domestic knowledge DA and foreign knowledge spillovers FA . For each country, 
foreign knowledge is a positive function of the knowledge stock in the rest of the OECD area. Finally, the model 
allows for exogenous shocks to TFP (U).  
(1')  ( ) tfFtdDttttt UAAHLKY θθβα ,,=          
The skill index H is defined as a function of the skill composition between low, medium and high skilled workers LL
, ML  and HL  respectively. 
(5) ( )
t
H
tH
M
tM
L
tL
t L
LLL
H
γγγ
,,,=         with HML LLLL ++=  
In the index, skills are ranked by their respective output elasticities ( HML γλγ << ) and these output elasticities 
are measured using information about average skill wage differentials.  
Thus the measure of (trend) TFP is given by : 
(6) 
 
t
F
tf
D
td
t
tM
H
t
tM
M
t
tL
Lt uAAL
L
L
L
L
L
TFP +++







+







+







= )log()log(logloglog)log( ,,, θθγγγ
 
This equation forms the basis of the TFP growth accounting exercise. 
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potential growth in the post-crisis period. (4) With 
respect to labour, available research suggests that 
the length of the downturn in the aftermath of the 
crisis is pivotal in determining the extent of 
damage to an economy’s underlying labour 
potential. A crisis can also reduce potential output 
in the short term through its adverse effects on 
investment. Given the unprecedented financial 
market problems, it is expected that the price and 
volume of capital will be affected but there is also 
a distinct risk of having an impaired capital 
allocation system. Deficiencies in the allocation 
function may result not only in a more anaemic 
investment trend in the recovery phase but also in 
a less than optimal reallocation of capital 
resources to aid the crucial restructuring of 
economies. With respect to TFP, economic theory 
and pre-crisis empirical evidence do not give a 
clear answer as to what the expected impact of the 
crisis on long-run TFP might be. Besides a 
number of mechanisms that tend to dampen TFP 
in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, including 
pro-cyclical R&D spending and higher risk 
premiums for venture capital financing, there are 
also arguments that downturns can have a positive 
TFP impact via a process of constructive 
restructuring and cleansing in the economy. (5) 
A look at the post-crisis evidence to date 
tentatively suggests that the severe economic 
shock has led to a significant downward revision 
in euro-area and US potential growth over the 
short run, with both euro-area and US rates falling 
by three quarters of a percentage point in 2010 
compared to 2007. In terms of the components of 
growth, the results are broadly in line with the 
expected effects for labour, capital and TFP: 
• Regarding labour, the crisis has produced 
substantial, short-run reductions in the growth 
contribution from labour in both the euro area 
and the US. The US has been relatively more 
affected on this front, with structural 
unemployment rising significantly compared 
with the pre-crisis period, compounded by a 
sharp fall in participation rates. (6) 
• As to capital, in keeping with the conclusions 
of the literature and the experiences of 
                                                        
(4) See, for example, Cerra, V. and S. Saxena (2008), ‘Growth 
dynamics: the myth of economic recovery’, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 98, No 1, pp. 439-57; Haugh D., P. 
Ollivaud and D. Turner (2009), ‘The macroeconomic 
consequences of banking crises in OECD countries’, OECD 
Economic Department Working Paper, No 683. 
(5) See, for example, Caballero, R.J. and M.L. Hammour (1994), 
‘The cleansing effect of recessions’, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84, No 5, pp. 1350-68. 
(6) See European Commission (2011), ‘European economic 
forecast — Autumn 2011’, European Economy, No 6. 
countries such as Finland, Sweden and Japan, 
the contribution of capital to growth in both 
the US and the euro area has been markedly 
reduced over the short run, with again the US 
being relatively more affected. 
• For TFP, the results need to be assessed 
against the a priori assumption that the final 
long-run outcome is dependent on a range of 
offsetting positive and negative factors. In the 
short run, this balancing act would be expected 
to produce a negative overall impact, with one-
off downward level shifts in TFP in a few 
crisis-related industries being a possible 
explanation. This is what appears to have 
happened so far, with both US and euro-area 
TFP growth rates declining compared with the 
pre-crisis period. It is hoped that these losses 
will be gradually recouped over the medium to 
long term, as gains from restructuring efforts 
start to emerge. 
In overall terms, the results for the period since 
the start of the crisis look to be broadly consistent 
with the mainstream predictions from the 
literature and from an analysis of a number of 
relevant individual country experiences. The crisis 
has resulted in a sharp, short-run downturn in 
potential growth rates. In addition, although the 
growth rate effects of the crisis are likely to be 
transitory, the initial fall in growth combined with 
a relatively slow return to pre-crisis rates over 
subsequent years is expected to produce a 
substantial loss in the euro area’s level of 
potential output. Such losses in levels will have 
significant implications in terms of the living 
standards and fiscal capacity of the most affected 
euro-area economies. 
Looking further ahead, concerns regarding 
potential output relate not only to unfavourable 
pre-crisis trends and to the negative impact of the 
crisis but also to the fact that, in the coming years, 
labour market developments will increasingly be 
dominated by the impact of ageing populations 
and its negative effect on labour supply. As 
capital accumulation is essentially driven over the 
long run by the emerging labour and TFP trends, 
it is clear that the euro area’s future growth 
prospects, especially its per capita income trends, 
will be largely determined by what happens to 
TFP.  (7) It is therefore critical to better 
understand the fundamental drivers of TFP. The 
next section goes on to look more deeply into the 
TFP concept 
                                                        
(7) See Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2001), ‘It’s not factor 
accumulation: Stylized facts and growth models’, World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 15, No 2, pp. 177-219. 
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and, in particular, its key knowledge determinants, 
including the skill composition of the labour 
force, the scale and efficiency of domestic 
research efforts and the importance of spillovers 
from the technological frontier. (8) 
I.2. A deeper analysis of TFP and of its 
fundamental drivers 
Estimating TFP is not straightforward since it is 
not a directly observable variable. There are two 
broad approaches to calculating trend TFP: an 
indirect approach, which focuses on isolating the 
cyclical component of actual TFP, and a direct 
approach, which focuses on isolating observable 
knowledge determinants of TFP. (9) 
Following an analysis by the EU’s Economic 
Policy Committee (EPC) of the advantages and 
disadvantages of both approaches, it was agreed 
that the indirect approach was the better method 
for official EU policy surveillance purposes. This 
conclusion reflected the significant limitations 
with structural models in that it is difficult to be 
sure that all of the key drivers are taken into 
account, and structural breaks are common. 
Focusing on isolating the cyclical component of 
the TFP series ensures that the signals from the 
most recent data indicators can be taken on board 
and that turning points can be more quickly 
established. Whilst the indirect approach has 
many advantages, its key drawback is that it gives 
no explanation of the structural determinants that 
are driving trend TFP developments. 
Consequently, it is essential to supplement the 
                                                        
(8) See Griliches, Z. (1979), ‘Issues in assessing the contribution 
of research and development to productivity growth’, Bell 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No 1, pp. 12-116. 
(9) For examples of the latter see, for example, the work of Jones 
(1995b and 2002) cited in Box I.1. 
official method with a more structural analysis of 
the determinants of TFP. This is what is done 
hereafter, with the first half of the section giving 
the official trend TFP estimates and the second 
half then providing an overview of the 
supplementary structural analysis, focusing on the 
role of the knowledge capital stock and the skill 
composition of the labour force. Whilst this 
supplementary analysis has been carried out for 
11 EU countries, the US and Japan, the objective 
of this section is to illustrate the usefulness of this 
approach, with Germany (a good proxy for the 
euro area as a whole) and the US being discussed 
in some detail. 
Official trend TFP estimates 
The trend TFP calculations are a fundamental 
component of the commonly agreed methodology 
for estimating total potential growth rates for EU 
Member States. Trend TFP is estimated using a 
bivariate Kalman Filter model for 18 of the 27 
Member States, with a simple HP filter being used 
for the remaining 9 Member States where short 
sample lengths preclude the use of the Kalman 
Filter. Both filtering approaches aim to isolate the 
cyclical component of actual TFP. In the case of 
the Kalman Filter, it does this by exploiting the 
link between the TFP cycle and the degree of 
capacity utilisation (CU). Survey data in 
manufacturing, services and construction are used 
to derive a CU index (see Graph I.2). (10) 
As shown in Graph I.3, German TFP growth rates 
have fallen by roughly 1 pp from around 1½ % in 
the mid-1990s to ½ % in 2010, a pattern almost 
identical to that for the euro area as a whole. The 
                                                        
(10) The data come from the EU harmonised business and 
consumer surveys. 
Graph I.2: Official TFP estimates for Germany 
(annual growth in %, 1980-2010) (1) 
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(1) TFP estimates calculated using the EPC’s commonly agreed methodology for potential growth. (2) KF = Kalman filter (3) CU = Capital 
utilisation in level terms, normalised 
Source: Commission services. 
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graph also shows that Germany and the euro area 
experienced a much greater decline in TFP growth 
rates compared with the US over the same 
period. (11) 
Graph I.3: TFP growth rates for the euro area, 
the US and Germany (in %, 1983-2010) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Knowledge determinants of TFP 
In order to isolate those factors which can explain 
this relatively poor German and euro-area 
performance, the cyclically focused analysis is 
supplemented with a more structural approach. 
The structural analysis has so far been carried out 
for 13 countries, but this focus section 
concentrates in particular on the specific cases of 
Germany and the US. 
The structural analysis focuses on two main 
drivers of TFP: changes in human skills and in the 
quantity and efficiency of domestic and foreign 
knowledge investments. For the latter, an 
important result discussed further below is the 
marked slowdown in international innovation 
efforts, leading to lower international spillover 
effects for all countries via cross-border 
technology and scientific knowledge diffusion. In 
many countries this is aggravated by a low 
capacity to absorb new foreign technologies (e.g. 
because of insufficient investment when these 
new technologies are embedded in equipment). It 
is important to stress upfront that the structural 
approach produces results which are broadly 
consistent with the official (i.e. EPC-endorsed), 
cyclically focused estimates based on the Kalman 
                                                        
(11) Unlike the TFP estimates for Germany and the euro area, 
which are produced using the official Kalman Filter 
approach, the TFP estimates for the US are produced using a 
simple, univariate HP filter. The basic problem with such 
univariate techniques is that they tend to produce imprecise 
estimates at the end of the sample period (and especially 
close to turning points/‘boom-bust’ episodes). Consequently, 
preliminary HP trend TFP estimates are frequently and 
sizeably revised over time. 
Filter method in the sense that it can explain a 
large part of the changes in ‘official’ TFP trends. 
This confirmation provides greater confidence in 
the accuracy of the official estimates. 
It is important to stress that whilst knowledge 
investments are a key driver of TFP, they are not 
the only driver, with the more efficient utilisation 
of factor inputs in production processes (i.e. static 
efficiency gains) also contributing. An economy’s 
ability to exploit novel technologies and to adapt 
to a rapidly changing technological environment 
is essential to its prospects for improving 
standards of living. In assessing the impact of 
both of these TFP drivers (i.e. knowledge 
production and factor efficiency), the time 
dimension needs to be taken into account. For 
example, while over the short to medium term, 
factor efficiency considerations could be an 
important driver of TFP changes, over the longer 
run it is knowledge investments which are the key 
determinant. Awareness of this time dimension 
underlines the fact that TFP is not just about 
knowledge production – in fact the other 
determinants such as levels of competition, scale 
economies and organisational / managerial best 
practices can periodically be as important.  
Contribution of skills to TFP trends. The current 
version of the official production function 
methodology uses a standard quantity measure of 
labour input (i.e. employment levels adjusted for 
hours worked) to calculate the contribution of 
labour to growth. The current approach should 
allow for differences in the productivity/‘quality’ 
of different workers but to construct such labour 
‘quality’ measures, datasets for the breakdown of 
total employment and labour compensation by 
high-, medium- and low-skill groupings are 
needed. (12) Eurostat unfortunately does not 
currently produce validated data series for these 
skill breakdowns. Consequently, official TFP 
measures overstate ‘true’ TFP by including these 
skill composition effects. 
In order to correct for this, observed TFP must be 
decomposed into a skill component and a residual 
TFP component. This is done by using an 
unofficial (i.e. not validated by Eurostat) skills-
based breakdown of employment and labour 
compensation from EU KLEMS, with the weights 
used in the aggregation of the different skill 
groups reflecting the average share of each skill 
                                                        
(12) See for instance: Denison, E.F. (1967), ‘Why growth rates 
differ: Postwar experience in nine Western countries’, The 
Brookings Institution and Jorgenson, D.W. (1995), 
‘Productivity’, MIT Press. 
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group in total labour compensation (see also 
Box I.1). (13) With this approach, a skills-based 
indicator of changes in the ‘quality’/productivity 
of the workforce over time can be constructed. 
The results for this index for Germany and the US 
are shown in Graph I.4, including a skills 
breakdown of the German workforce. As can be 
seen from the skills breakdown, until the late 
1990s there was an upward movement in the 
shares of medium- and high-skilled workers, with 
a reduction in the share of the low skilled. Since 
then, Germany has experienced an increase in the 
share of the low skilled and a reduction in 
medium skilled, with only the high skilled share 
continuing to increase. Part of the latter trend may 
be explained by the temporary effect of labour 
market reforms focused on low-skilled workers. 
But it also reflects a more persistent structural 
change as evidenced by the fact that it started 
before the major labour market reforms were put 
in place. It is also observable in a broad number of 
other euro-area Member States. 
Contribution of innovation capital to TFP 
trends. In addition to skills, domestic and foreign 
innovation patterns are also playing a significant 
role in the German TFP story. To look at this 
question, the official TFP model adjusted for 
skills described earlier has been augmented so as 
to include intangible investment variables such as 
innovation capital, in order to try to directly 
explain the skills-adjusted actual TFP series. The 
specification for both the skills-adjusted official 
model and the knowledge-augmented variant are 
discussed in Box I.1. The augmented model is 
                                                        
(13) EU KLEMS stands for EU-level analysis of capital (K), 
labour (L), energy (E), materials (M) and service (S) inputs. 
EU KLEMS provides a system of analysis at industry level 
which encompasses internationally harmonised, national 
accounts-based statistics and indicators, as well as an 
analytical framework for interpreting this information based 
on input-output analysis and growth accounting. 
estimated as an unobserved components model 
where overall trend TFP (as derived from the 
skills-adjusted official model) is decomposed into 
an observable component, driven by domestic and 
foreign knowledge investments, and an 
unobserved trend component, which is essentially 
driven by everything else affecting trend TFP. 
The key coefficients are those which measure the 
strength of the relationship between domestic 
knowledge investments and domestic TFP and the 
extent of technology spillovers from abroad, 
linked to worldwide knowledge investments. (14) 
In estimating this model, a fundamental question 
to ask at the outset is which indicator of 
innovation capital to use, with the choice being 
between using total intangible investments or just 
a proportion of the total, namely scientific R&D 
investments. (15) This is not a simple choice since 
the literature informs us that non-scientific 
intangible investments may be particularly 
important for explaining TFP trends in market 
services. However, given the ongoing conceptual 
                                                        
(14) See for instance: 
Coe, D. and E. Helpman (1995), ‘International R&D 
spillovers’, European Economic Review, Vol. 39, No 5, pp. 
859-887.  
Griffith, R., S. Redding and J. van Reenen (2004), ‘Mapping 
the two faces of R&D: productivity growth in a panel of 
OECD industries’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 
86, No 4, pp. 883-895. 
Guellac, D. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004), 
‘From R&D to productivity growth: do the institutional 
settings and the source of funds of R&D matter?’, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 66, No 3, pp. 353-
378. 
(15) According to Corrado et al., intangible investments should be 
broken down into five key areas: (1) scientific R&D; (2) non-
scientific R&D (measured by resources devoted to innovation 
and to new product/process R&D which does not draw on a 
scientific knowledge base); (3) computerised information 
systems (essentially investments in computer software); (4) 
firm-specific resources (including human capital investments 
— such as training — and organisational/restructuring skills); 
and (5) brand equity. See Corrado et al. (2006). 
Graph I.4: Contribution to TFP from the skills composition of the workforce and skills breakdown in 
Germany (1982-2010) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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and data availability problems with non-scientific 
investments, the analysis presented here focuses 
only on scientific R&D, which for many of the 
countries analysed amounts to roughly 50 % of 
total intangible investments. (16) 
Another choice to make is between R&D 
expenditures or R&D volumes, as proxied by the 
amount of human resources devoted to science 
and technology (S&T). Since cross-country 
comparisons of the R&D expenditure data can 
sometimes suffer not only from exchange rate 
issues but also from wage inflation pressures in 
the research sector, it was decided to opt for the 
volume of human resources devoted to research. 
Further choices had to be made between the 
widest definition of the amount of human 
resources in S&T (which would include all people 
with both a tertiary level education and an S&T 
occupation) and the narrowest definition, namely 
researchers. It was decided to opt for the 
narrowest definition on the grounds that, of all the 
human resources devoted to S&T in an economy, 
the researchers sub-grouping is central to a 
country’s R&D effort. Like in Germany, it is not 
surprising that this sub-grouping often makes up 
little more than 1 % of total employment since, to 
be included in this group, the OECD’s Frascati 
manual states that the researcher must be 
‘engaged in the conception or creation of new 
knowledge, products, processes, methods and 
systems and also in the management of the 
projects concerned’. 
Using the data for R&D researchers, a stock 
measure of the physical innovation inputs in the 
different countries was constructed, with a world 
total being created by aggregating the results for 
each of the countries. (17) The numbers of 
researchers are cumulated in order to construct the 
domestic and foreign stocks of knowledge, using 
the perpetual inventory method and an assumption 
of a 10 % depreciation rate. The foreign 
knowledge stock series for each country is the 
world total excluding the country itself. 
Using the calculations for domestic and world 
innovation capital stocks, Germany’s innovation 
performance can be directly compared to that of 
the US. Regarding trends with respect to foreign 
R&D capital stocks, developments in Germany 
are broadly comparable to those of the US, with 
                                                        
(16) See references in the box such as Griliches (1992); Cincera 
and Van Pottelsberghe (2001); van Ark et al. (2009). 
(17) Due to data limitations, the world total is in reality only an 
‘OECD’ world total and clearly further work in this area will 
be needed to construct a truly global measure of world R&D 
efforts. 
both countries being faced with an apparent 
slowdown in the growth rate of the global stock of 
knowledge. However, since the US has a 
dominating share of the global total, the relatively 
dramatic slowdown in the growth rate of domestic 
researchers in the US has implications for all of 
the other countries in the sample, due to cross-
border knowledge spillovers. This slowdown in 
the growth rate of the domestic knowledge capital 
stock in the US may be partly linked to the US 
entry restrictions put in place following the 9/11 
tragedy, with knock-on effects in terms of the 
numbers of foreign students taking up advanced-
level studies in US universities. This may have 
reduced the supply of qualified personnel for US 
private and public research labs. 
Turning to domestically driven innovation, the 
evidence for Germany is relatively positive, with 
annual growth rates of German knowledge 
investments being broadly comparable to those of 
the US over the last 30 years (apart from an 
unusual pattern around German unification). 
There was a slight acceleration in US knowledge 
investments in the post-1995 period which was 
not really replicated in Germany, with most of the 
differences over this period due to the US’s higher 
investments in a few critical ICT-producing 
manufacturing industries. The acceleration proved 
temporary, however, with growth rates of 
domestic R&D capital stocks slowing rapidly in 
the US from around 2004 onwards. 
In addition to the quantities of innovation capital, 
the estimates of elasticities/rates of return on those 
knowledge investments suggest that there are only 
small efficiency differences between Germany 
and the US, with foreign R&D elasticity almost 
identical in both countries and with domestic 
R&D elasticity in Germany being somewhat 
higher (see Table I.1). Similar domestic 
knowledge elasticities to those of Germany have 
been obtained for the Netherlands and Ireland. For 
Finland, the elasticity lies between those of 
Germany and the US. Belgium and France have 
elasticities which are close to those of the US. The 
output elasticities for Italy, Portugal and Spain are 
slightly lower than in the US. Finland has the 
highest output elasticity for knowledge spillovers, 
followed by Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. The remaining countries in the sample 
have somewhat smaller coefficients. Interestingly, 
the knowledge spillover parameters are not 
(inversely) linked to the size of the economy, but 
may rather reflect the degree of international 
integration in the production of high-tech 
products. 
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Table I.1: Coefficients for domestic and 
foreign R&D capital 
Domestic R&D 
Elasticity
Foreign R&D Elasticity
Germany 0.15 0.12
US 0.11 0.11  
Source: Commission services. 
 
There is a strong link between these estimated 
elasticities and rates of return on knowledge 
investments in terms of output. A rough rule of 
thumb suggests that a 0.1 elasticity would equate 
to a rate of return of 55 %, assuming an R&D 
expenditure intensity of 2 % and a depreciation 
rate of 10 %. (18) Using this rule, the implied rates 
of return on domestic German and US knowledge 
investments are reasonably similar, with rates in 
both countries estimated to lie between 60 % and 
90 %. These rates are in keeping with the 
estimated rates of return in the literature, as shown 
in Table I.2. 
When the knowledge stock growth rates and the 
estimated elasticities shown in Table I.1 are 
combined, the percentage point contribution from 
domestic and world innovation capital stocks to 
TFP growth can be calculated for the last 30 years 
(Graph I.5). The graph shows, for example for 
Germany, that there has been a sharp decline in 
the contribution from world innovation capital to 
German TFP growth. Since the US has such a 
large weighting in the world total, this German 
trend is clearly heavily influenced by US domestic 
                                                        
(18) The output elasticity is the percentage change in GDP divided 
by the percentage change in knowledge capital, while the rate 
of return is the absolute change in output relative to the 
absolute change in knowledge (the derivative of output with 
respect to knowledge). Therefore the elasticity must be 
divided by the knowledge-to-TFP ratio to arrive at the rate of 
return. Since knowledge is a stock it can be expressed as the 
R&D flow divided by the depreciation rate. 
developments. This is of course partly explained 
by the large decline in the contribution of US 
domestic innovation capital to US TFP growth. 
This rather alarming US trend with respect to 
domestic knowledge investments is not replicated 
in Germany, where domestic R&D investments 
have continued to contribute, on an annual 
average basis, around 0.4 pp to total TFP, 
compared with 0.1 pp in the US. 
 
Table I.2: Estimated rates of return to private 
R&D (in %) 
Author (year) Private return Social return
(private return + knowledge spillovers)
Sveikauskas (1981) 7-25 50
Bernstein-Nadiri (1988) 10-27 11-111
Bernstein-Nadiri (1991) 15-28 20-110
Nadiri (1993) 20-30 50
Mansfield (1977) 25 56
Goto-Suzuki (1989) 26 80
Terleckyj (1974) 29 48-78
Scherer (1982,1984) 29-43 64-147
 
Source: Fraumeni, B.M. and S. Okubo (2005), ‘R&D in the 
National Income and Product Accounts: A first look at its effect 
on GDP’, in Corrado, C., J. Haltiwanger and D. Sichel (eds.), 
‘Measuring capital in the new economy’, Studies in Income and 
Wealth, Vol. 65, NBER. 
 
On the basis of the analysis so far, Table I.3 and 
Graph I.6 bring together the results from the skills 
analysis and from the domestic and knowledge 
capital stocks to show that this structural TFP 
approach can effectively supplement the official 
TFP analysis (which focuses on isolating the 
cyclical component of TFP). 
Table I.3 shows part of the normal output from 
the official production function approach and then 
it adds an additional section which shows a 
decomposition of the official TFP series into the 
contribution from skills, from domestic R&D 
capital and from spillovers from the foreign R&D 
capital stock. If one subtracts these three columns 
Graph I.5: Contribution from domestic and world innovation capital stocks to TFP growth for 
Germany and the US (in pp, 1982-2010) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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from the official total trend TFP, one is left with 
the unobserved trend component — in other 
words, that part of the trend which the structural 
model cannot explain. For example, if one looks 
at the decline in German TFP growth of around 
1 pp between 1995 and 2010, one sees that over 
half of the decline can be explained by changes in 
the observable knowledge determinants of TFP, 
with the greatest declines coming in the 
contribution from skills and from foreign spillover 
effects. The same factors are clearly at play at the 
level of the euro area as a whole. 
 
Table I.3: Potential growth and its 
determinants in Germany (1991-2010) 
Total labour 
(hours) 
contribution
Capital 
accumulation 
contribution
TFP 
contribution 
(1)
Skills Domestic 
R&D 
capital 
stock
Foreign 
R&D 
capital 
stock
Unexplained 
trend 
component
1991 3.2 0.3 0.9 2.0 0.3 1.1 0.4 0.1
1992 2.9 -0.1 1.0 1.9 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.3
1993 2.4 -0.2 0.8 1.7 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.3
1994 2.0 -0.5 0.9 1.6 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4
1995 1.9 -0.4 0.8 1.4 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4
1996 1.8 -0.3 0.7 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
1997 1.7 -0.3 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
1998 1.7 -0.2 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4
1999 1.8 -0.2 0.8 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.3
2000 1.8 -0.2 0.8 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4
2001 1.7 -0.1 0.6 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.4
2002 1.5 0.0 0.4 1.1 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.4
2003 1.3 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.2
2004 1.2 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2
2005 1.1 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2
2006 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1
2007 1.3 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0
2008 1.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0
2009 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 -0.1
2010 1.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0
Contributions to potential growth Trend TFP decomposition (structural / 
knowledge determinants)
Total 
potential 
growth
 
(1) The official method focuses on isolating the cyclical 
component. 
Source: Commission services 
 
Finally, Graph I.6 gives an overview of the total 
results for Germany and the US, showing the 
official trend TFP estimates together with the 
observed trend component (driven by skills and 
domestic and foreign knowledge capital) and the 
unobserved trend component. Graph I.6 suggests 
that the structural approach produces relatively 
plausible results for Germany, with the observed 
trend component closely tracking the official 
trend TFP estimates. Part of this result could be 
due to our focus on scientific R&D researchers, 
which are a key driver of TFP trends in 
manufacturing industries, this sector being pivotal 
in explaining Germany’s overall innovation 
performance. 
The approach is less successful in explaining US 
trend TFP developments. This could be due to our 
exclusion of non-scientific intangible investments 
from our intangible investments total. As 
explained earlier, these investments (such as non-
scientific R&D, firm-specific resources, brand 
equity and computerised information systems) 
have been cited in the literature as being a key 
driver of the productivity revolution in US service 
industries, such as retail and wholesale trade and 
financial services. An alternative explanation is 
that the official model may be overestimating 
trend TFP in the US over this period, with 
historical trend revisions likely in the future as the 
evidence on underperforming investments from 
the post-1995 period starts to accumulate. An 
assessment of the ‘real’ underlying rate of TFP 
growth in the US is also complicated by the fact 
that, unlike the calculations for Germany, the 
official estimate is not based on the Kalman filter 
approach. It could turn out that with future data 
revisions, and with better filtering techniques, 
perhaps a greater part of actual TFP developments 
in the US since the mid-1990s reflected cyclical 
Graph I.6: Comparison of official TFP trends with those based on knowledge determinants, Germany 
and the US (in %, 1982-2010) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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factors rather than a genuine structural break in 
the US private services sector. (19) 
Overall, over half of the TFP decline in Germany 
since the mid-1990s can be explained by a 
deterioration in the contribution to knowledge 
production from skills and from domestic and 
foreign capital stocks. Despite domestic 
innovation levels holding up reasonably well over 
the period, there has been a sharp deterioration in 
the contribution from foreign innovation capital, 
reflecting in particular the slowdown in US R&D 
efforts. The combination of these innovation 
patterns with the deterioration in the skill 
composition of the German labour force produces 
knowledge-induced TFP results that are very 
much consistent with the results for Germany 
from the official, cyclically focused TFP 
methodology. Finally, whilst this section has 
focused on Germany (given its influence on 
overall euro-area patterns), the analyses carried 
out for some other Member States confirm the 
useful complementary role which this structural 
approach can provide in better understanding TFP 
patterns in all those euro-area countries for which 
data currently exist. Similar results to those for 
Germany also hold for other euro-area countries 
in the sample. In particular, there is a slowdown in 
the contribution of skill upgrading to TFP as well 
as a slowdown in the growth rate of R&D inputs. 
I.3. Conclusions and policy implications 
Trends in total factor productivity in the euro area 
since the 1990s are worrying and call for 
determined policy action. In the long run, TFP is 
the main driver of income per capita and the 
deceleration of TFP growth by about 1 pp over the 
past two decades is in itself a serious source of 
concern. But it is particularly worrying at the 
present time given that the euro area is facing a 
number of serious medium- to long-term growth 
challenges. These include the negative effect of 
the crisis on potential output, persistent downside 
pressures on demand due to balance sheet 
consolidation in the private or the public sector in 
many Member States and the impact of population 
ageing on labour supply and investment. 
To tackle these challenges, the Commission has 
placed productivity growth at the centre of its 
Europe 2020 strategy. In its recent ‘Initiative for 
growth, governance and stability’, it has renewed 
                                                        
(19) The results for the US are not representative for the total 
sample of countries for which results are currently available. 
Results similar to those for Germany, in terms of closely 
tracking the official trend TFP estimates, have been found in 
a significant number of the sample countries. 
its call for growth prospects and productivity to be 
enhanced by pursuing strong structural reforms, 
acknowledging that progress so far has been slow. 
Against this background, the structural analysis of 
TFP presented in this section offers further 
empirical backing for calls for rapid 
implementation of productivity-enhancing 
structural reforms. Focusing on knowledge 
investments, it identifies three areas where policy 
measures could have a substantial effect on 
productivity. 
First, it confirms previous empirical work 
regarding the importance of the skill composition 
of the labour force for productivity. It also 
highlights the negative contribution of the skill 
composition to growth since the beginning of the 
previous decade. Though part of this result 
reflects the temporary effect of reforms aimed at 
bringing back low-skilled workers into 
employment, it is also an indication of a more 
enduring structural trend. This clearly backs the 
call for better educational attainment and, in 
particular, the Europe 2020 targets of reducing 
school drop-out rates below 10 % and lifting the 
share of 30-34-year-olds with third level 
education to at least 40 %. 
Second, the analysis also shows quantitatively the 
importance of innovation capital for growth and 
highlights the high rate of return on public R&D. 
Although recent trends in R&D investment have 
been rather conducive to productivity gains in 
some euro-area Member States, this is not the case 
for others where further effort is needed to 
counteract a trend towards decelerating 
knowledge investments. It is also important to 
make sure that ongoing public finance 
consolidation does not excessively affect public 
R&D spending as this would weigh on 
productivity prospects further down the road. 
Overall, the analysis vindicates the Europe 2020 
target of lifting the combined share of public and 
private investment in R&D and innovation to 3 % 
of EU GDP. 
A final finding of the analysis is the important 
role of cross-border knowledge spillovers. A 
worrying decline in innovation capital at the 
world level is weighing on TFP growth in all the 
euro-area Member States. In some of them, the 
trend is magnified by a low capacity to absorb 
cross-border spillovers. Further work is needed to 
better understand the determinants of the 
absorption capacity for technology and to design 
policy measures that could enhance it. In any 
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event, strong knowledge spillovers, combined 
with a declining trend in the accumulation of 
innovation capital worldwide, support the case for 
concerted international coordination in this area, 
both at the European and the world levels. Efforts 
to boost the stock of knowledge in a country 
would bring higher returns in terms of growth if 
matched by similar efforts in other countries. 
Overall, the analysis shows that policies aimed at 
fostering knowledge investment and technology 
absorption should be an important part of 
productivity-enhancing reforms. It is, 
nevertheless, important to stress that knowledge 
investment is an important but not the sole driver 
of productivity. A comprehensive policy package 
to boost TFP growth should therefore also contain 
complementary measures aimed at a more 
efficient use of factor inputs in production 
processes, including the removal of obstacles to 
competition, the encouragement of 
entrepreneurship and enterprise creations and, 
more generally, the establishment of a more 
business friendly environment.  
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The impact of the crisis on household savings in the euro area 
This section provides an analysis of euro-area households’ savings behaviour since the onset of the global 
economic crisis. It concludes that the current level of the saving rate is broadly in line with its fundamental 
drivers (housing and financial wealth, interest rates, etc.) although the dynamics of savings since the crisis also 
seem to have been affected by temporary precautionary motives related to fluctuations in confidence. Asset 
price developments between the onset of the crisis and summer 2011 have not been a major cause of a rise in 
savings in the euro area. This is explained by the comparatively small weight of equity in total household assets 
and the positive effect of falls in house prices on consumption via the ‘down-payment channel’. Looking 
forward, however, the risks of an increase in savings are significant. Recent falls in equity prices are likely to 
push up savings. More restrictive lending practices by banks could also affect savings via more difficult access 
to both consumer credit and, more significantly, mortgages (down-payment channel). Finally, recent losses in 
consumer confidence could also pave the way for a temporary rise in precautionary savings. 
Accounting for inflation dynamics in the euro area 
Consumer price developments over the course of 2011 have displayed considerable volatility and surprised on 
the upside. This section assesses the contributing factors to this year’s consumer price inflation, examining in 
particular the major role that energy and other commodity prices have played in driving inflation. Despite 
global GDP growth momentum fading since early 2011, commodity prices have declined only moderately and 
the pass through to consumer prices is still ongoing. In addition, headline and core inflation in 2011 were 
driven by unusually strong seasonal variations for clothing and footwear products, reflecting the temporary 
effect of a methodological change concerning the compilation of the HICP statistics in several Member States. 
Looking forward, labour cost developments and recent signals from survey- and market-based inflation 
expectations show that underlying inflation pressures remain contained. Taking into account weak economic 
growth and the diminishing impact of high commodity prices, headline inflation is expected to return to below 
2 % in the euro area in 2012 and 2013. 
How vulnerable are emerging market economies to the slowdown in advanced economies? 
This section assesses the vulnerability of emerging market economies (EME) to the ongoing slowdown in 
advanced economies. Even though EME have proved resilient during the 2008-09 recession, evidence so far 
suggests that GDP growth tends to be increasingly correlated globally. As a result, a major downturn or an 
outright recession in advanced countries is likely to have a detrimental impact on growth in emerging market 
economies, although the negative effect is likely to be partly cushioned by emerging economies’ high trend 
growth. Business cycle spillovers may occur via various propagation mechanisms, of which international trade 
linkages amplified by global vertical specialisation is the most obvious. International financial linkages 
constitute an additional contagion channel, for example through the high correlation of global stock markets or 
the exposure of US and European banks to emerging market economies. Emerging markets' reliance on banks 
of advanced economies remains relatively high although its degree varies with the regions concerned and is 
primarily high for a few Asian countries and Eastern Europe. Finally, confidence spillovers are increasingly 
seen as a further potential source of contagion which particularly applies to business sentiment. 
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II.1. The impact of the crisis on 
household savings in the euro area 
Private consumption has been a major source of 
weakness in the recovery from the global 
economic and financial crisis. Since the cyclical 
trough in the second quarter of 2009, euro-area 
real consumption has increased by a cumulated 
1.2 %, compared with 3.8 % for GDP. The 
significantly slower rate of expansion than in 
previous recoveries is attributable to sluggish 
growth in real disposable income (Graph II.1.1) 
rather than to adverse changes in the saving rate. 
Developments in households’ saving rate have 
actually been supportive of spending since the 
trough of the recession in 2009Q2. After an abrupt 
increase of more than 1.5 pp in the early stages of 
the recession, the euro-area saving rate has fallen 
back progressively with the recovery, reaching 
pre-crisis levels at the end of 2010 before rising 
again somewhat during the first half of 2011 
(latest available data) (see Graph II.1.2). 
Graph II.1.1: Household private consumption and 
disposable income, euro area  
(index 2006Q1= 100, 2006Q1-2011Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
These developments are at odds with the expected 
negative effects of sharp falls in asset prices on 
household consumption via wealth effects. 
Despite some gains with the recovery, equity 
prices in the euro area were still about 25 % below 
their pre-crisis peak in the second quarter of 2011 
(i.e. at the time of the latest available saving rate 
data). House prices have, on average, been more 
resilient to the crisis, incurring more limited 
losses during the recession and recovering 
moderately afterwards with an overall loss 
relative to the pre-crisis peak of about 1 % in the 
second quarter of 2011. Their near stagnation over 
the past three years should, however, be seen 
against a trend of continuous rises in house prices 
in pre-crisis years with average annual gains of 
about 6 % since the late 1990s. 
Against this background, the present section sets 
out to better understand recent developments in 
the euro-area saving rate, trying to disentangle the 
effects of changes in fundamentals (mostly 
wealth) from other possible factors such as 
precautionary savings. 
Graph II.1.2: Household saving rate, euro area  
(% of disp. income, 2005Q1-2011Q2) (1) 
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(1) Saving rate as used in the model in Box II.1.1. Calculated as 1 
minus the ratio of household consumption to disposable income.  
Source: Commission services. 
Recent cyclical swings in savings can partly be 
explained by fundamentals 
The analysis presented hereafter is based on an 
estimated model of household savings and 
mortgage decisions (see Box for details). (20) The 
model relates euro-area household mortgage and 
savings decisions to a limited set of fundamental 
determinants. It captures quite well trends in the 
euro-area saving rate since the 1980s.  
The model makes it possible to identify a ‘down-
payment channel’. This channel postulates a 
positive (negative) link between house prices and 
savings (private consumption). It is directly 
related to the existence of constraints on mortgage 
borrowing. In most parts of the euro area, banks 
lend less than the full value of a housing 
acquisition (technically, loan-to-value ratios are 
below 1) in order to cover risks of cyclical 
changes in house prices and the costs of 
foreclosure. As a result, first-time buyers 
(together with owners who want to acquire a 
property of higher value) need to set money aside 
to cover the part of their acquisition that is not 
covered by the mortgage (i.e. the down-payment).  
                                                        
(20) See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 8, No 3, 2009. A 
more detailed presentation of the model is also available in: 
Balta, N. and E. Ruscher (2011), ‘Household savings and 
mortgage decisions: the role of the “down-payment channel” 
in the euro area’, European Economy, Economic Papers, 
No 445 (September). 
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Box II.1.1: A model of household savings and mortgage decisions in the euro area
This box presents an update of an estimated model of household savings and mortgage decisions presented in an 
earlier issue of the Quarterly Report on the Euro Area. (1) The model relates euro-area savings and mortgage debt 
(as ratios of households' gross disposable income) to their respective medium-term determinants in a system of two 
co-integrating relations estimated in a VEC model with seven variables. All variables are in logarithms except for 
the two interest rates (in %) and inflation (in %). Net housing wealth is defined as housing wealth minus mortgage 
loans. Net financial wealth is defined as financial wealth minus non-mortgage credit. Data cover the period 1980Q4-
2011Q2. 
Elasticities of the co-integrating equations (1): 
 Savings equation Mortgage equation 
 I I bis II 
Savings/Disposable income 1.00 1.00 - 
Mortgages/ Disposable income 0.33  1.00 
Mortgages/Net housing wealth  0.33  
Net financial wealth/Disp. income 0.72 0.72 - 
Net housing wealth/Disp. income -0.25 +0.08 -0.65 
Short-term real interest rate - - 3.70 
Long-term real interest rate 4.89 4.89 8.68 
Inflation 3.58 3.58 6.94 
Constant -6.56 -6.56 -0.48 
(1)The variables are all non-stationary. The Johansen approach was used to test for the number of co-
integrating relations and to estimate the equations. Over-identifying restrictions were tested, LR test for 
binding restrictions (rank=2), chi-square (7) =7.39. 
All estimated coefficients are significant at 1%.  
Sources: Commission services and ECB data. 
 
The medium-term savings equation (I) 
Net financial wealth comes out as the main determinant of the savings ratio in the medium-term in the euro area. A 
1% increase in net financial wealth as a share of gross disposable income leads to a decrease of about 0.7% in the 
savings ratio (a drop of about 0.1 pp given its current level), boosting consumption by about 0.1%.  
The net housing wealth ratio has an overall positive effect on the saving rate (i.e. an increase in housing wealth 
pushes savings). This apparently paradoxical effect (estimated consumption equations usually come up with 
negative or zero effect) can be explained by the co-existence of two channels via which housing wealth impacts 
savings. Equation I can be reinterpreted (Equation I bis) so as to allow the identification of i) a small but significant 
housing wealth effect, captured by the ratio of net housing wealth to disposable income, combined with ii) a credit-
constraint effect ("down-payment channel") captured by the ratio of mortgages to net housing wealth. This ratio can 
be interpreted as a de-facto "loan-to-value ratio", capturing the extent to which the credit-constrained households 
need to save in the euro area in order to pay for the share of the acquired property value not covered by the 
mortgage. In the reinterpreted equation the estimated coefficients are as follows: (1) a 1% increase in the ratio of 
mortgage to net housing wealth will decrease the savings ratio by 0.33%; (2) a 1% increase in the net housing 
wealth leads to a 0.08% decrease in the savings ratio (i.e. 0.33*log(Mortgages/Disp. income) - 0.25*log(Net housing 
wealth/ Disp. income) = 0.33*log(Mortgages/Net housing wealth) +0.08*log(Net housing wealth/Disp. income). 
This shows a small traditional housing wealth effect from an increase in housing wealth at the level of the euro area. 
An interesting feature of the model is that it shows that a rise in houses pushes the savings of euro-area households 
down via the traditional housing wealth effect but the fall is more than offset by the down-payment channel (i.e. 
higher house prices force credit-constrained households to save more in order to cover a more expensive down-
payment). Overall, increases in house prices in the euro area tend to be associated with rises in household's 
saving rate.  
                                                          
(1) See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 8, No 3, 2009. A more detailed presentation of the model is also available in: 
Balta, N. and E. Ruscher (2011), ‘Household savings and mortgage decisions: the role of the “down-payment channel” in the 
euro area’, European Economy, Economic Papers, No 445 (September).  
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An increase in house prices raises the value of the 
down-payment and thereby encourages property 
buyers to set more money aside, i.e. to increase 
their savings and reduce their consumption. The 
down-payment channel and the traditional 
housing wealth channel operate in opposite 
directions. In the case of the down-payment 
channel, an increase in house prices entails an 
increase in household savings, whereas in the case 
of the wealth channel it entails a drop in savings. 
A surprising result of the model is that, in the euro 
area, estimates suggest that the down-payment 
channel more than offsets the traditional housing 
wealth effect, leading to an overall positive 
relationship between house prices and savings. 
According to the model, pre-crisis trends in the 
euro-area saving rate can largely be explained by 
a combination of changes in financial wealth and 
the down-payment channel. A simultaneous 
increase in financial wealth and relaxation of 
credit constraints (i.e. lower down-payments) 
explain most of the substantial fall in the euro-
area saving rate in the 1990s. During the pre-crisis 
years of the 2000s, developments in both 
variables were less supportive, with rapid rises in 
housing prices offsetting the effect of looser credit 
constraints and progress in financial wealth 
hampered by the bursting of the dotcom bubble. 
As a result, the saving rate fluctuated without 
showing a clear trend over that period. 
Turning to the impact of the crisis, Graph II.1.3 
displays the actual euro-area savings ratio 
alongside its simulated value according to the 
model. Two observations stand out. 
First, the crisis has not entailed changes in the 
fundamental drivers of savings that are 
sufficiently large and lasting to bring about a 
protracted increase in the saving rate. In the 
second quarter of 2011, the saving rate implied by 
the model was actually clearly below its pre-crisis 
level. 
Second, the model can explain the pattern of 
fluctuations in savings during the recession and 
the recovery, with an increase during the 
recession followed by a return to pre-crisis levels 
during the recovery. However, fluctuations appear 
more muted for the simulated saving rate than for 
the actual one, suggesting that fundamentals 
cannot fully account for the dynamics of the 
saving rate during the cycle. 
Graph II.1.3: Euro-area saving rate, simulated 
and actual values  
(in % of disposable income, 2005Q1-2011Q1) 
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(1) The simulated value of the saving rate comes from the 
estimated model presented in Box II.1.1. for explanations. For the 
actual saving rate see footnote of Graph II.1.2. 
Source: Commission services.  
 
The remainder of the section discusses these two 
observations further. 
Wealth effects have remained limited since the 
crisis 
Looking more closely into the impact of the fall in 
asset prices triggered by the crisis, the assessment 
is more benign than one might expect given the 
magnitude of the crisis. Overall, the model 
Box (continued) 
 
The medium-term mortgage equation (II) 
The medium-term determinants of mortgages as percentage of gross disposable income have been found to be the 
net housing wealth as percentage of gross disposable income, the short-term real interest rate, the long-term real 
interest rate and inflation. In the medium-term, 1% increase in net housing wealth increases mortgages by about 
0.65%, showing the extent of the collateral effect of net housing wealth on mortgages. The interest rates and 
inflation variables have the expected signs. A 1pp increases in the short-term real interest rate and the long-term real 
interest rate decreases the mortgage ratio by about 4% and 9% respectively. This shows that long-term interest rates 
are playing a bigger role in the euro area in accordance with the euro-area mortgage markets where fixed-interest-
rate contracts dominate. A 1pp increase in inflation decreases the mortgage ratio by about 7%. 
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suggests that the fall may have actually pushed 
the saving rate slightly lower. Traditional wealth 
effects of falls in equity and housing prices have, 
to some extent, exerted upward pressures on 
savings during the crisis but the pressures have 
remained small and have been offset by other 
factors, including the down-payment channel, 
which has operated in the opposite direction. 
This conclusion may be surprising in the light of 
the overall large losses in equity markets 
registered over the period 2007Q4-2011Q2. It is, 
however, important to put equities in the broader 
context of households’ total financial asset 
holdings, which also include deposits, bonds and 
holdings in life insurance and pension fund 
reserves. Equities actually amount to only a 
quarter of households’ total financial asset 
holdings, with deposits or equity holdings in life 
insurance and pension fund reserves being of a 
comparable or higher importance (Graph II.1.4). 
Graph II.1.4: Composition of household financial 
assets, euro area  
(in %, average 2006Q3-2011Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Price fluctuations in the non-equity asset 
categories are either limited or little correlated to 
equity prices. Consequently, even large falls in 
equity prices tend to have only a moderate impact 
on households’ overall financial wealth. This is 
illustrated in Graph II.1.5, which displays 
valuation effects on households’ holdings of total 
assets and equity assets. (21) In the second quarter 
of 2011, households had lost about 20 % on the 
value of their equity holdings but only 6 % on the 
value of their overall financial assets. 
When assessing trends in household wealth, an 
additional dimension to bear in mind is that 
                                                        
(21) Valuation effects are calculated by deducting asset 
acquisitions from changes in the stock of assets. They 
measure the change in asset holdings that is attributable to 
changes in asset prices.  
changes in household asset holdings reflect 
changes in prices but also asset acquisition. Since 
the onset of the crisis euro-area households have 
continued to accumulate financial assets, although 
at a lower pace than in pre-crisis years and while 
reducing their exposure to equity. 
Graph II.1.5: Valuation effects on household 
assets, euro area  
(index 2005Q1=100, 2005Q1-20011Q2) 
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(1) Valuation effects are estimated from the financial balance 
sheet and financial transaction data of National Accounts. 
Changes in asset holdings are decomposed into a transaction 
component and a residual valuation component. 
Source: European Commission.  
As shown in Graph II.1.6, the ratio of households' 
net financial wealth (defined as financial wealth 
minus the stock of consumer credit) to disposable 
income dropped during the recession but has since 
recovered significantly and in 2011Q2 was less 
than 5 pp below its pre-crisis peak. This implies 
only moderate negative financial wealth effects on 
consumption over the period. This limited effect 
is explained by the relatively low share of equity 
in households' wealth as well as the continuous 
accumulation of financial assets since the crisis. 
Turning to households’ net housing wealth (as 
defined by housing wealth minus mortgage debt), 
the impact of the recession has been relatively 
similar to what has been observed for financial 
assets. The ratio of net housing wealth to 
disposable income dropped as a result of the 
recession but has since partly recovered though at 
a more muted pace than net financial wealth. In 
the first half of 2011, the ratio fell back somewhat 
and was about 7 pp below its pre-crisis peak. This 
suggests a moderate upward push of the savings 
ratio due to traditional housing wealth effects 
since the onset of the crisis. Nevertheless, the 
estimated model of savings also shows that the 
easing of house prices brought about by the crisis 
has entailed a de facto easing of credit constraints 
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on mortgages (22) (down-payment channel) that 
has more than offset this upward push. Taking 
into account these opposing forces, developments 
in housing wealth since the onset of the crisis 
have led to a modest decrease in households’ 
saving rate. 
Graph II.1.6: Household net financial and net 
housing assets, euro area 
(% of disposable income, 2005Q1-20011Q2) 
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Source: Commission services, ECB. 
Precautionary motives have probably also 
played a role 
Whereas the estimated model of savings suggests 
that fundamentals such as wealth can explain the 
currently low level of the saving rate, it fails to 
fully track the swings of the savings ratio during 
the recession and the recovery. This suggests that 
the rapid increase in the saving rate during the 
recession and its similarly rapid decline in the 
recovery were not only driven by changes in the 
fundamental determinants of savings. As the 
phase of rapid increase in savings roughly 
corresponds to the contraction phase of the GDP 
cycle, it could be partly related to precautionary 
motives. In line with this interpretation is the fact 
that the swings in the saving rate during the crisis 
are, to some extent, correlated with some 
indicators of consumer confidence. This is 
illustrated in Graph II.1.7, which displays the 
actual saving rate and the simulated saving rate 
presented in Graph II.1.3 together with a measure 
of consumers’ fears of unemployment.  
The temporary rise in precautionary savings in 
2008-09 probably reflects households' increased 
uncertainty about the economic outlook and 
deteriorating personal income prospects. It might 
also be an indication of their rising concerns about 
the sustainability of sovereign debt in the euro 
                                                        
(22) For a given loan-to-value ratio, a fall in house prices means 
that a household will have to bring less cash (i.e. draw less on 
its savings) to acquire a given property. 
area and an anticipation of future hikes in taxes 
and cuts in government transfers. However, such 
Ricardian effects, if confirmed, would have been 
only temporary, as indicated by the return of the 
saving rate to the level dictated by wealth 
fundamentals in the second quarter of 2011. 
Graph II.1.7: Household saving rate and 
unemployment fears, euro area  
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(1) The simulated and actual saving rates are the same as in 
Graph II.1.3. Unemployment fears come from the Commission 
consumer survey (question on unemployment prospects over next 
12 months). 
Source: Commission services.  
Looking forward, the risks of an increase in 
savings remain significant 
Looking ahead, the risks of an increase in 
households’ saving rate, with depressing 
consequences for private consumption, remain 
significant for the second half of 2011 and the 
first quarters of 2012. Possible upward pressures 
on savings could come from three sources. 
First, since the second quarter of 2011 (the most 
recent quarter covered in the analysis presented 
above) equity markets have again registered sharp 
losses, with prices 15-20 % lower at the beginning 
of December than their average value in the 
second quarter. On the basis of the model used 
here, such a drop, if persistent, would push up the 
saving rate by close to half a percentage point 
(taking into account the relatively low share of 
equity in households’ financial assets). 
Second, because of the down-payment channel, 
recent developments in house prices through the 
crisis have been rather supportive of consumption. 
However, the existence of such a down-payment 
channel also implies downside risks to 
consumption related to credit constraints on 
mortgages. Because of this channel, the links 
between private consumption and credit 
constraints is far stronger than what could be 
assumed on the basis of the low importance of 
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consumer credit in the euro area. (23) Tighter 
credit constraints weigh on consumption not only 
directly via more restricted access to consumer 
credit but also, indirectly, via constraints on 
access to mortgages and the related need to save 
to acquire a house. Hence, if banks were to adopt 
more conservative mortgage lending practices, for 
example by raising loan-to-value ratios, negative 
implications for household spending would not be 
limited to housing investment but would also 
involve consumption. 
Third, the crisis has also shown that, when faced 
with significant economic uncertainty, households  
                                                        
(23) In the euro area, the stock of outstanding mortgages is more 
than five times bigger than the stock of outstanding consumer 
credit. 
may raise their savings above what is normally 
justified by changes in fundamentals such as 
wealth. The substantial fall in consumer 
confidence since the summer suggests that this 
precautionary motive might again be governing 
households’ purchasing plans at the current 
juncture. 
Finally, the necessary consolidation of public 
finances over the coming years may affect 
households' savings via Ricardian effects, 
although such effects appear so far to have been 
either small or temporary.  
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II.2. Accounting for inflation dynamics in 
the euro area 
Introduction 
Consumer price developments over the course of 
2011 have displayed considerable volatility and 
surprised on the upside. This special topic 
therefore aims to assess the contributing factors to 
this year’s consumer price inflation. It examines 
in particular the role that energy and other 
commodity prices have played in driving 
inflation. This section also reviews the effect of 
methodological changes to the measurement of 
the harmonised consumer price index (HICP), 
takes a look at labour cost developments and 
examines recent signals from survey- and market-
based inflation expectations. Finally, the latest 
inflation outlook from the European 
Commission’s autumn 2011 forecast is presented. 
Inflation developments in the euro area 
Despite the overall weak growth performance, the 
annual headline inflation rate in the euro area 
stood at 3.0 % in October 2011, unchanged from 
September and at the highest level since October 
2008. HICP inflation in the euro area rose in the 
second quarter of 2011 to 2.7 % from 2.5 % in the 
first. Over the course of the year a number of 
idiosyncratic factors stood out in the euro area’s 
inflation path: a 0.2 pp decrease in the July 
headline figure was due to unusual price 
developments for seasonal products, which were 
also largely responsible for the bounce-back in the 
headline figure in September. As such, prices of 
seasonal items have been affected by a 
methodological change concerning the treatment 
of seasonal products (see Box II.2.1). (24) On the 
other hand, indirect taxation changes had a small 
positive impact on inflation over this period. (25) 
As shown in Graph II.2.1, energy price 
movements have accounted for a large portion of 
HICP inflation since late 2007, and have also 
driven the change in overall inflation. Annual 
energy inflation accelerated to 12.4 % in October 
2011, having dipped to 10.8 % in June from a 
peak of 13.1 % in February. Sharp price rises for 
Brent crude in 2011Q1 have driven this surge in 
energy inflation. Since increasing sharply between 
                                                        
(24) The estimated impact of this methodological change on the 
annual headline figure is 0.2 pp in July and August, but zero 
in June and September. 
(25) Assuming full and immediate pass-through of tax changes, 
the impact on the headline figure fell in August by 0.2 pp 
(from 0.3 in July to 0.1 pp) and remained unchanged in 
September. 
December 2010 and March 2011, oil prices have 
hovered around 80 euros per barrel. Brent 
remained 33 % more expensive in euro terms in 
the period from May to October 2011 compared 
to the same period in 2010. 
Graph II.2.1: HICP inflation and contributions, 
euro area  
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Source: Eurostat. 
Geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and 
North Africa and changes in economic growth 
prospects contributed to these oil price 
developments. Arguably, the recent oil price 
shock since the end of 2010 can be considered 
more severe for the euro area than the one in 
2007-08, due to its more protracted nature. (26) As 
Graph II.2.2 illustrates, other commodities prices 
followed a similar price pattern to oil until April, 
but have followed a declining trend since. 
Graph II.2.2: Commodities prices, euro area 
(HWWI indices, 2010=100, Nov. 2003-Nov. 2011) 
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Source: Reuters EcoWin. 
 
                                                        
(26) For a detailed analysis of oil price developments in early 
2011 and their impact on euro-area inflation differences, see 
European Commission (2011), ‘Inflation developments in the 
euro area’, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 10, No 1. 
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Box II.2.1: The impact of the new treatment of seasonal items in the HICP
A change in the treatment of seasonal items in the HICP basket entered into force in all EU Member States in 
January 2011. (1) It has led to significant one-off fluctuations in the inflation rate in the euro-area aggregate (up to 
0.2 pp). At the level of individual Member States, this volatility has been much higher in some cases (up to -1.1 pp 
in Greece and -0.9 pp in Italy or +0.7 pp in Slovenia). In most other Member States the impact has been minimal.   
In spite of their inherent volatility, seasonal products should be included in the HICP basket, but their correct price 
measurement requires special treatment. The new Regulation targets only ‘strongly’ seasonal items, which are 
available only part of the year. ‘Weakly’ seasonal items, which are available all year but at seasonally fluctuating 
prices and quantities, can also cause ‘statistical fog’ (in month-to-month and index figures) in the analysis of 
headline inflation. 
The new standards for the treatment of seasonal items cover those goods and services that are not available, or 
purchased in small or negligible volumes, for certain periods in a typical annual cycle. Climate, traditions and 
institutional arrangements are the main causes of seasonal unavailability. Typically, these products can be found in 
the following COICOP (2) classes: fish, fruit, vegetables, clothing and footwear, which carry a combined weight of 
10.5 % in the euro-area HICP. Strongly seasonal goods may also appear in other categories such as sports 
equipment, recreational services or package holidays, as the list of seasonal products is not uniform across countries. 
The aim of the new Regulation is to harmonise the statistical treatment of such items by restricting the 
choice of calculation methods, thereby delivering sufficiently comparable results at the level of all-items 
HICP. It allows two broad calculation methods to be applied, namely the strict annual weights method 
and the class-confined seasonal weights method. (3) 
The strict annual weights method applies the same expenditure weights for seasonal products in all 
months using imputed prices in the out-of season months. Within this method, prices of seasonal products 
that are in season can be used to estimate the index for out-of-season products (counter-seasonal 
estimation), or else the index of out-of-season products can be estimated using price developments of all 
available products in the whole COICOP class or a sub-category of it (all-seasonal estimation). 
The class-confined seasonal weights method changes weights in various months according to the 
consumption pattern found in the base period for products that are out of season. The total weight of the 
COICOP class or group is constant throughout the year, allowing for zero weights for products that are 
out of season. 
Overall, there is no entirely satisfactory way of dealing with seasonal items, particularly when estimating the 
monthly or quarterly HICP. The strict annual weights approach relies on potentially imprecise imputation of missing 
prices and its annual fixed weights will not be representative of monthly consumption patterns. However, its 
advantage is its ease of implementation and preservation of the annual basket methodology. 
Alternatively, attaching a zero weight to the missing product classes complicates month-to-month comparisons and 
is conceptually inconsistent with a fixed basket index. In addition, the seasonal weights are determined by past 
consumption patterns, so that abnormal seasonal fluctuations are not taken into account. On the plus side, however, 
this approach respects changing seasonal consumption patterns and the reality of household spending, as well as 
reducing the need for price imputation. 
Ultimately, both methods face the implementation challenge of accurately identifying seasonal items in the basket 
and carefully pre-defining the length of the seasonal cycle. This is not an easy task as the seasonal availability of 
products may vary between regions and seasons might change with weather conditions from one year to another. 
In most euro-area Member States, the Regulation did not bring about major changes and had thus little impact on 
headline inflation. Only in Spain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal were the methods previously used 
                                                          
1  See Commission Regulation (EC) No 330/2009 of 22 April 2009. 
2  COICOP signifies ‘Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose’ and is a reference classification published 
by the United Nations Statistics Division. In the case of the HICP used in the European Union, it comprises 127 positions at 
the first four levels and around 900 positions when adding a fifth and a sixth digit. 
3  See Eurostat, Implementation of Commission Regulation (EC) No 330/2009 on the treatment of seasonal products — 
Information note and impacts on the HICP 2011; latest update: 16 November 2011.  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2011 
 
- 30 - 
Among non-oil commodities, broad-based and 
sharp price rises have been visible in recent years, 
but especially since late 2010, due to a 
combination of demand pressures and weather-
related declines in agricultural production in 
different parts of the world. Steep price rises 
during late 2010 and early 2011 only started 
receding for most major non-oil commodities in 
autumn, bringing their year-on-year inflation 
down to zero or negative territory in November 
2011. Earlier price rises up to March 2011 saw 
wheat prices double in price compared to twelve 
months earlier. For industrial metals, year-on-year 
price increases in January and February ranged 
from +15 % for zinc to over 40 % for copper and 
nickel. China's role in these developments stands 
out as a significant factor in this surge via 
increased demand and production cutbacks (in the 
case of aluminium). Steel prices also soared in the 
first quarter following major floods in Australia.  
At the same time, precious metals prices have also 
recently reached new peaks, in many cases driven 
by safe haven purchases against the background 
of concerns about the a possible economic 
downturn. Since the start of 2010 gold prices have 
been rising at annual rates of around 25%, all the 
way up to November 2011, and silver prices have 
risen even more steeply.  
While upstream price pressures have intensified 
(although only temporarily in some cases), core 
inflation, which excludes the most volatile price 
components (i.e. energy and unprocessed food) 
and provides an approximate measure of 
underlying price dynamics, has so far remained 
moderate. Core inflation remained at 2.0% in 
October, thus remaining at the highest rate since 
December 2008. The pick-up in core inflation 
observed since August 2011 stems mainly from 
seasonal goods and partly from changes in 
taxation (see Box II.2.1).  
Looking ahead, core inflation is subject to 
diverging forces. On the one hand, the indirect 
impact of past commodity price increases - still 
visible in producer prices - may continue to feed 
through to consumer price inflation. Recent 
experience suggests that broad-based commodity 
rallies take between three and five quarters to 
Box (continued) 
 
significantly different. In terms of timing, only Spain has revised HICP data for the year preceding implementation 
(i.e. 2010). Spain’s annual average inflation rate for 2010 was adjusted from 1.8 % to 2.0 %, with large counteracting 
effects across different months of the year. In 2011 the impact has been largest in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia 
and (outside the euro area) Latvia (see Graph). The distortion of the annual HICP inflation rate in the euro area has 
been limited so far, although about 0.2 pp of the 0.5 pp increase in headline inflation in September 2011 can be 
explained by the impact of the new treatment of seasonal items (which had lowered the headline inflation rate in 
July and August, but had no impact in September). While for the rest of the year the changes in seasonal patterns 
make it more challenging to assess inflation changes, it is expected that the overall impact on the annual average 
HICP for 2011 will be minor. 
Impact of seasonal items measurement on annual HICP inflation in selected EU Member States 
(in pp, Jan 2011-Sept 2011) 
     
Given the freedom in the choice of the various methods for varying classes and due to deviations in the 
implementation date in some Member States, the ensuing volatility has temporarily impaired the comparability and 
transparency of annual HICP data. However, the methodological change affects annual inflation rates only during 
the year of implementation. While month-to-month volatility may increase, year-on-year changes can be expected to 
return to a relatively normal pattern as of 2012. 
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show up in core inflation. (27) Given that year-on-
year commodity price inflation has only receded 
to broadly neutral territory in autumn, resulting 
indirect price pressures for core inflation may 
therefore persist until at least mid-2012. On the 
other hand, while second-round effects on general 
wages and prices might in principle also occur, 
weak economic activity in the medium term 
should greatly limit this risk.  
Unit labour costs reveal no material threat to 
price stability 
Up to mid-2011 labour market conditions in the 
euro area stabilised and signs of a tentative 
recovery in labour markets became visible. 
Employment growth was marginally positive in 
the last quarter of 2010 and in the first half of 
2011. Despite some improvement in economic 
activity and employment, the unemployment rate 
has remained stubbornly high over recent months. 
The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate has 
remained around 10 % — i.e. close to the highest 
level since the launch of the euro (10.2 % reached 
in April 2010) — since the end of 2009. This 
compares with an unemployment rate of 7.4 % in 
the first half of 2008. 
Graph II.2.3: Labour cost and productivity, euro 
area 
(y-o-y changes in %, 2004Q2-2011Q2) 
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Source: Eurostat. 
The slowing of the economic recovery in the 
second and third quarters of 2011 and the highly 
uncertain economic climate are broadly keeping 
wage increases in check in the euro area. 
Graph II.2.3 reflects this in key metrics of labour 
cost developments. After bottoming out at 1.5 % 
in the third quarter of 2010 (the lowest rate since 
the euro’s introduction), the annual rate of growth 
in negotiated wages in the euro area began to 
                                                        
(27) Source: Commission calculations using Eurostat and 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) data 
increase incrementally, reaching 1.9 % in the 
second quarter of 2011. Despite the upward trend, 
negotiated wage growth has still remained below 
its average rate since 1999 (2.4 %). 
Year-on-year growth in compensation per 
employee also gradually picked up to 2.5 % in the 
second quarter of 2011, from 1.3 % in the last 
quarter of 2009. Since labour productivity growth 
reached 1.5 % in the second quarter, unit labour 
cost growth accelerated to 1 %, thus still 
remaining below the average of 1.5 % since 1999. 
Going forward, labour cost pressures are likely to 
remain contained in the medium term in the light 
of continued slack on the labour market and a 
weak growth outlook. 
Inflation expectations defy recent volatility 
Various indicators of inflation expectations point 
towards inflation subsiding over the medium term 
from its currently high level. While the spike in 
inflation since late 2010 is contemporaneously 
visible in all expectation measures considered, 
longer-term expectations have almost entirely 
settled back to moderate levels. As shown in 
Graph II.2.4, consumer surveys by the European 
Commission suggest that in the near term 
households on balance still expect significant 
price rises over the coming 12-month period. But 
with the depicted positive balance reading for 
short-term expectations having eased from its 
March 2011 peak, the surge in inflation may be 
starting to fade from consumers’ minds. 
Graph II.2.4: Inflation expectations, euro area 
(balances in %, Oct 2005-Oct 2011) 
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Source: European Commission. 
Evidence from inflation swaps points to a decline 
in longer-term inflation expectations. (28) The 
                                                        
(28) As inflation swaps are unaffected by differential liquidity 
conditions in nominal and real bond markets or by flight-to-
liquidity flows, they arguably provide more robust signals 
than those derived from inflation-linked bonds. 
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rates of zero-coupon inflation swaps, which 
provide a market-based measure of inflation 
expectations at different horizons, have all trended 
downward since April 2011, notwithstanding an 
uptick in October. As shown in Graph II.2.5, 
breakeven inflation rates across a range of 
maturities have trended downwards since mid-
August. At implied inflation rates of around 1¾-
2 % in mid-November, these rates remain at a 
level consistent with price stability. This confirms 
the solid anchoring of inflation expectations in the 
euro area over the medium term. 
Graph II.2.5: Euro-area inflation swap rates 
(%, Jan 2009-Nov 2011) 
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Source: EcoWin 
Inflation outlook appears benign despite risks 
The Commission’s autumn 2011 forecast, 
released on 10 November, projects an annual 
euro-area inflation rate of 2.6 % in 2011. Financial 
market tensions within the euro area intensified 
over the summer while global growth slowed 
down, driving down prospects for a sustained 
recovery of domestic demand. This should ease 
upward pressure on euro-area inflation over the 
coming months, when higher commodity prices 
will still be feeding through and indirect taxation 
will also likely have some upward effect. In 
addition, the recorded headline inflation rate may 
be lowered by base effects all the way until May 
2012 (except in January). 
Looking further ahead, the economic slowdown 
and persistent labour market weaknesses in 
several euro-area Member States are likely to put 
downward pressure on annual inflation, which is 
expected to fall to 1.7 % in 2012. In particular, 
wages are not expected to fully catch up with the 
higher-than-previously-expected inflation of 
2011, not least in view of the high unemployment. 
Additionally, weak demand conditions will limit 
firms’ ability to pass on higher commodity prices 
to consumers, instead leaving them to absorb part 
of the shock in their profit margins. 
Graph II.2.6: Euro-area HICP inflation 
(% y-o-y, Mar 2011-Dec 2012) (1) 
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(1) Shaded area represents the maximum-minimum range of 
euro-area Member States. 
Source: European Commission 
Base effects are projected to temporarily raise 
inflation between May and July 2012, but the 
overall rate is expected to follow a declining trend 
in 2012, falling below 2 % from the second 
quarter on. The ongoing fiscal consolidation may 
increase headline inflation through indirect tax 
rises and administered prices, though the risk of 
second-round effects appears low. As the recovery 
in 2013 is forecast to remain moderate, HICP 
inflation is expected to remain low at 1.6 % that 
year. 
The risks around the inflation outlook appear 
broadly balanced and relate mainly to the 
uncertainty concerning economic growth and 
commodity price developments. Rising 
commodity prices, in tandem with potential 
further decoupling of emerging market economies 
from advanced countries or a weakening 
exchange rate, could put pressure on import prices 
and thereby on inflation, even if growth is 
anaemic in the euro area. Moreover, in the past 
few years commodity prices have shown a swift 
upward response whenever the global economic 
situation has started to improve. The key 
downside risk to the inflation outlook relates to 
lower-than-expected growth, which could further 
dampen price pressures amid weak demand and 
labour market conditions. 
Conclusion 
Inflation in the euro area has risen markedly in 
2011 due to higher energy prices and signs of a 
strengthening economic recovery in the early part 
of the year. Despite the growth momentum fading 
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since, commodity prices — particularly oil prices 
— declined only moderately and the pass-through 
to consumer prices is still ongoing. Furthermore, 
both headline and core inflation were driven by 
unusually strong seasonal variations for clothing 
and footwear products, reflecting the temporary 
effect of a methodological change concerning the 
compilation of the HICP statistics in several 
Member States. 
The slowing pace of economic recovery and the 
uncertain growth outlook are keeping wage 
increases in the euro area in check. Going 
forward, labour cost pressures are likely to remain 
contained in the medium term in the light of  
continued slack on the labour market. Meanwhile, 
inflation expectations remain firmly anchored at 
levels consistent with price stability, and both 
market-based and survey-based indicators of 
short-term and long-term inflation expectations 
have been trending lower since the spring. 
Headline inflation is expected to return to below 
2 % in the euro area in 2012 and 2013, taking into 
account weak economic growth and the 
diminishing impact of high commodity prices. 
The risks around the inflation outlook appear 
broadly balanced and relate mainly to the 
uncertainty concerning economic growth and 
commodity price developments. 
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II.3. How vulnerable are emerging market 
economies to the slowdown in 
advanced economies? 
Introduction 
Although emerging market economies are now 
much more integrated into global trade and capital 
markets than in the past, they have proved more 
resilient during the Great Recession of 2008-09 
than in previous recessionary periods. With the 
notable exception of the CIS countries and some 
Eastern European Member States, the emerging 
world, in particular Asia and Latin America, was 
apparently better able to cope with the 
repercussions of the trade collapse and the deep 
slump in advanced countries triggered by the 
Lehman meltdown in September 2008. At first 
glance, this seems to contradict the persistent 
trend of increasing globalisation: rising 
interdependence in the world economy would 
suggest closer co-movement of economic activity 
across regions and countries. Similarly, the two-
speed recovery of the global economy since 2009 
seems to have lent new support to the decoupling 
hypothesis which postulates that emerging market 
economies have become less dependent on 
advanced economies as export markets or 
creditors. 
Decoupling is not just a theoretical issue: it may 
also have a major impact on the dynamics of 
global growth in the imminent future. With the 
global economy losing steam and the recovery in 
Europe put on hold what are the prospects for 
emerging market economies? To what extent will 
emerging market economies manage to shield 
themselves from the downturn in advanced 
economies? 
This section attempts to shed some light on the 
revived decoupling debate with a particular focus 
on emerging markets economies' reaction vis-à-
vis the expected downturn in advanced 
economies. In this regard, several transmission 
mechanisms are identified for the cross-border 
propagation of shocks. The most obvious ones are 
(1) through international trade and (2) via 
financial linkages related to the exposure to 
foreign banks, holdings of foreign assets and 
stock market contagion. However, during the 
Great Recession the world economy might also 
have been subject to a global confidence shock. 
For that reason, (3) spill-over effects of 
confidence indicators are also scrutinised. The rest 
of the section discusses each transmission channel 
in more detail. 
Decoupling or (re)coupling? 
Since the end of the 1990s, real GDP growth rates 
in emerging markets have become much more 
correlated with those in advanced economies. 
During the same period, however, GDP growth in 
the emerging world has exhibited a substantial 
upward level shift, which suggests markedly 
higher trend growth (Graph II.3.1). This is likely 
to be due to an underlying catching-up process 
and the implied shift of capital and labour from 
low-productivity to high-productivity sectors. 
Furthermore, some large emerging market 
economies, notably China and Brazil, appear to 
act increasingly as independent sources of global 
growth. (29) 
Graph II.3.1: Real GDP growth, advanced and 
emerging economies  
(annual changes in %, 1980-2011) (1) 
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(1) Country aggregation according to IMF definitions (WEO). 
Source: IMF. 
Regarding the recession of 2008-09, it is 
noteworthy that real GDP strongly co-moved in 
advanced and emerging markets and that the latter 
had to bear similar output losses when compared 
to potential output. In contrast to previous global 
recessionary periods however, emerging markets 
now appear to better absorb shocks from the rich 
world. This is associated with the implementation 
of improved macroeconomic policy frameworks 
and the strengthening of financial institutions in 
response to the debt and financial crises in the 
1980s and 1990s. The scope thus obtained for 
anti-cyclical fiscal and monetary policy has been 
used to cushion the impact of the recession and 
thus sustain economic activity. Looking ahead, 
sound macroeconomic policies together with 
structural shifts and the still prevalent 
convergence gap might continue to shift growth 
                                                        
(29) On the other hand, emerging markets geographically close to 
the rich world, for example Mexico or Eastern Europe, are 
still rather dependent on their developed neighbours. 
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drivers in emerging market economies further to 
consumption and investment. 
One way to reconcile the opposing trends of rising 
global integration and increased regional 
resilience is therefore to distinguish between long-
term shifts and cyclical co-movements. (30) The 
claim that activity in advanced and emerging 
economies substantially co-move is corroborated 
by decomposing GDP growth rates into cyclical 
and trend components using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (Graph II.3.2). Based on this methodology, 
long-term trend decoupling coincides with 
increasing short-term cyclical co-movement. This 
dichotomy is especially pronounced since the 
mid-1990s. (31) 
Graph II.3.2: Trend versus cyclical decoupling, 
advanced and emerging economies  
(1980-2011) (1) 
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(1) Cycle and trend components of annual GDP growth rates are 
estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter (lambda=100). 
Trends are expressed in annual growth rates (in %) and cycles in 
% of trend. 
Source: IMF, Commission calculations. 
In a recent study, Yetman (2011) finds that 
business cycles strongly co-move during 
recessions, but are rather uncorrelated in non-
recession periods. (32) In light of these results and 
referring to the current economic situation, a 
major recession in the US or in Europe would 
likely entail a slowdown in emerging economies. 
These suggestions are supported by a similar 
                                                        
(30) Canuto, O. (2010), ‘Recoupling or switchover: Developing 
countries in the global economy’, in: Canuto, O. and M. 
Giugale (eds.), The day after tomorrow: A handbook on the 
future of economic policy in the developing world, World 
Bank, 2010, p. 31-49. 
(31) A word of warning is in order when applying mechanical 
filters to identify permanent and cyclical components of time 
series. Apart from the well-known endpoint sample problem, 
a major drawback (not only) of the HP filter is that it may 
introduce spurious cyclicality into the irregular component of 
a series.  
(32) Yetman, J. (2011), ‘Exporting recessions: International links 
and the business cycle’, Economics Letters, Vol. 110, No 1, 
pp 12-14. 
investigation by Imbs (2010) based on monthly 
industrial production data. (33) 
Using a dynamic factor model with 106 countries 
and annual data for 1960-2008, Kose et al. (2010) 
make a cautious case for decoupling. (34) They 
find some indication of business cycle 
convergence starting in the mid-1980s within 
industrial countries and emerging markets, but 
also divergence between these two groups. 
Although the authors identify a common factor 
(e.g. related to oil price shocks) in international 
business cycle fluctuations, the group-specific 
factor seems to have gained relative importance 
over the sample period. The predominance of 
regional factors over a global factor is also 
suggested by an IMF study based on a similar 
methodology. (35) According to the IMF, the 
increasing importance of regional factors from the 
mid-1980s onward is associated with the 
intensification of regional trade and financial 
linkages. However, both studies do not include the 
2008-09 recession and might rather point to long-
term trend divergence between advanced and 
emerging economies than short-term decoupling. 
Overall, even though emerging market economies 
proved rather resilient during the last recession 
and recovered quickly afterwards, there is little 
empirical evidence so far suggesting a general 
business cycle decoupling. However, it is true that 
emerging market economies have featured higher 
trend growth rates than their more advanced 
trading partners and are likely to outpace their 
developed economy counterparts in the future. 
These diverging trends notwithstanding, GDP 
growth tends to be increasingly correlated 
globally, with co-movement particularly 
pronounced in recessionary periods. Thus, a major 
downturn or an outright recession in advanced 
countries is likely to have a detrimental impact on 
growth in emerging market economies. The 
underlying business cycle spillovers might occur 
through various propagation channels which are 
examined in the next section. 
Cross-border transmission channels 
Openness to trade and finance are well-
established globalisation indicators and are likely 
                                                        
(33) Imbs, J. (2010), ‘The first global recession in decades’, IMF 
Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 327-354. 
(34) Kose, M. A., C. Otrok and E. Prasad (2010), ‘Global business 
cycles: convergence or decoupling?’, manuscript, revised 
version of NBER Working Paper No 14929, 2008. 
(35) IMF (2007), ‘Decoupling the train? Spillovers and cycles in 
the global economy’, World Economic Outlook, April 2007, 
pp 139-144. 
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to facilitate business cycle transmission between 
countries. (36) Additionally, cross-border 
confidence spill-overs have progressively come to 
be regarded as channels for the propagation of 
shocks from advanced to emerging market 
economies. 
Trade relations 
In 2010, emerging and developing economies 
accounted for almost 50% of world GDP and well 
over a third of world exports. From a theoretical 
point of view, increasing international trade can 
lead to business cycles that either converge or 
diverge across countries. On the one hand, a 
positive demand shock in one country may spill 
over to trading partners via increasing demand for 
exports, resulting in strong correlation between 
trade relations and economic activity across 
countries. On the other hand, increasing trade 
integration may induce greater specialisation of 
production across countries that eventually brings 
about less synchronised business cycles. 
Turning to the empirics, integration of emerging 
markets into the world economy and the 
internationalisation of supply chains have led to 
increasing trade between the rich and the 
emerging world. (37) The 2008-09 recession has 
only briefly interrupted this trend. Overall, trade 
dynamics have been highly synchronised in recent 
years. Against this backdrop, a slowdown of 
growth in advanced economies is likely to impact 
significantly on emerging markets' exports 
(Graph II.3.3). 
An important factor in the propagation of shocks 
is the internationalisation of production processes. 
In practice, global supply chains and vertical 
specialisation – i.e. the break-up of production 
into multiple stages across different countries – 
tend to amplify the impact of GDP fluctuations on 
international trade (bullwhip effect). (38) Given that 
exports and imports are recorded as gross flows, 
while GDP is measured in terms of value added, 
an initially small decline in GDP can cause a 
disproportionately high drop in trade, in both final 
and intermediate goods. Recent empirical 
                                                        
(36) Artis, M. and T. Okubo (2009), ‘Globalization and business 
cycle transmission’, North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance, Vol. 20, No 2, pp. 91-99. 
(37) The consequences of cross-border vertical integration have 
been demonstrated for instance by the supply shortages 
linked to the Tōhoku earthquake in Japan in March 2011. 
(38) This effect derives its name from the larger and larger swings 
in inventory further and further back in the supply chain in 
response to changes in demand for a final product. Since 
these amplifying oscillations are reminiscent of a cracking 
whip, it became known as the ‘bullwhip effect’. 
evidence suggests that tight cross-border supply 
chain linkages reinforce the transmission of 
business fluctuations between countries. (39)  
Graph II.3.3: Export growth, advanced and 
emerging economies  
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Source: CPB, Commission calculations. 
Turning to particular emerging market economies, 
East Asia and Central and Eastern Europe appear 
exceedingly vulnerable to a slowdown in 
industrial output in advanced economies given for 
example their large clusters of subcontractors in 
the production of semiconductors and car 
components respectively. Therefore, business 
cycle co-movement is likely to depend on the 
specific structure of production and the degree of 
intra-industry trade. (40) 
As regards commodity-producing countries, 
mostly located in the emerging world, economic 
activity is closely related to commodity prices. 
Thus, these economies might be subject to 
negative terms-of-trade effects resulting from 
downward pressure on commodity prices due to 
the slowdown in advanced economies. However, 
commodity price movements may affect fuel 
exporters and non-energy producers differently 
depending on the relative size of commodity 
exports and imports. (41) Keeping this 
                                                        
(39) Arkolakis, C. and A. Ramanarayanan (2009), ‘Vertical 
specialization and international business cycle 
synchronization’, Globalization and Monetary Policy 
Institute Working Paper, 21, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; 
Artis, M. and T. Okubo (2011), ‘Does international trade 
really lead to business cycle synchronization? A panel data 
approach’, Discussion Paper, DP2011-05, Research Institute 
for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe 
University, 2011. 
(40) Calderón, C., A. Chong and E. Stein (2007), ‘Trade intensity 
and business cycle synchronization: Are developing countries 
any different?’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 71, 
No. 1, pp 2-21. 
(41) Spatafora, N. and I. Tytell (2009), ‘Commodity terms of 
trade: The history of booms and busts’, IMF Working Paper 
09/205, September. 
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qualification in mind, the overall impact of terms-
of-trade effects on the economy crucially depends 
on exchange rate behaviour. For example, a real 
depreciation might dampen the potentially 
contractionary effect of terms-of-trade decreases 
resulting from a commodity slump. 
Generally, the gradual shift toward higher 
exchange rate flexibility in several emerging 
markets after the Asian crisis was conducive to 
price competiveness during the last recession and 
thus supported exports during the subsequent 
recovery. (42) Following this line of reasoning, 
rather than having decoupled from their advanced 
counterparts emerging market economies seem to 
have become relatively more flexible, a change 
that facilitates the absorption of shocks. 
Financial linkages 
As the global financial crisis has clearly 
demonstrated, financial linkages through stock 
and credit markets or via the banking system can 
amplify the propagation of shocks. Already during 
the financial crisis in 1997/98, the Western banks’ 
precipitous retreat from emerging Asian 
economies highlighted the potentially devastating 
effects of short-term borrowing, especially in 
foreign currency. At first sight, these bank 
linkages should be even stronger now than in the 
late 1990s. According to the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), foreign bank claims on 
emerging market economies surged in the second 
half of the 2000s, fell briefly during the 2008-09 
recession but have recovered since (Graph II.3.4). 
In the second quarter of 2011, they exceeded their 
level of mid-2008 by 14.5% and reached USD 
3242 bn, with claims on emerging market banks 
accounting for 54% of total foreign lending. 
Based on the BIS consolidated banking statistics 
which additionally account for the exposure of 
banks' foreign affiliates and net out inter-office 
positions, international banks' adjusted claims to 
emerging markets (excluding offshore centres) 
were USD 5615 bn in June 2011 or 22.4% of 
emerging market economies’ GDP (Graph II.3.5). 
Emerging economies' exposure to banks from 
advanced economies should, however, be 
interpreted with caution as it hides important 
regional disparities. 
 
                                                        
(42) However, foreign exchange interventions and exchange rate 
management are still prevalent in Asian emerging markets; 
see Rajan, R. S. (2010), ‘The evolution and impact of 
exchange rate regimes’, ADB Economics Working Paper, 
208, July 2010 (revised January 2011). 
Graph II.3.4: Cross-border bank claims on 
emerging market economies  
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(1) Excluding off-shore financial centres (e.g. Hong Kong and 
Singapore) to avoid double counting, as much of what banks lend 
to these financial centres is on-lent to other economies. 
Source: BIS. 
 
Graph II.3.5: Cross-border bank claims on 
emerging market economies  
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(1) Cross-border bank claims on an immediate borrower basis. 
Source: BIS, IMF; Commission calculations. 
Having learnt the lessons from the Asian crisis in 
the late 1990s, several countries in the region have 
reduced their dependence on short-term bank 
lending, and they have thus become less prone to 
sudden capital outflows. An additional step taken 
by some was the adoption of more flexible 
exchange-rate regimes which has limited the risk 
of currency crises. (43) 
The stock of gross cross-border claims in 2011-
Q2 amounts to 43% of the aggregate foreign 
exchange reserves of emerging economies. 
However, a large share of reserves is held by 
China and the oil-exporting countries in the 
Middle East. Emerging market economies with 
                                                        
(43) IMF (2010), World Economic Outlook, October 2010, p. 13-
15. 
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lower exchange reserves, not least those which 
have already abolished financial account 
restrictions, might be more exposed to balance-of-
payment and exchange-rate crises if international 
banks retreat precipitously than average figures 
suggest. These risks are exacerbated by the still 
limited role of domestic-currency debt in the 
funding of external liabilities. This is particularly 
true in times of global liquidity constraints and 
high risk aversion. For example, the US dollar 
shortage resulting from a withdrawal of US dollar 
money funds from bank-issued paper in the wake 
of the Lehman collapse induced massive capital 
outflows in terms of a cutback in US dollar cross-
border bank claims and local currencies, 
particularly in emerging Asia, plummeted 
accordingly. (44) 
Even though cross-border lending to emerging 
Asia has surged since late 2009, Central and 
Eastern European Member States appear to be the 
most vulnerable to a retrenchment of banks due to 
their much bigger exposure (Graph II.3.5). (45) 
Alongside a few Asian countries such as 
Malaysia (46), Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, 
Eastern European countries have by far the 
highest ratios of international bank claims to 
GDP. Especially non-euro area Member States 
with large shares of foreign-currency-
denominated loans are at risk, given that domestic 
monetary authorities' ability to provide liquidity in 
foreign currency to the domestic banking sector is 
quite limited. 
There is some evidence that international banks 
are reconsidering their presence in emerging 
markets, especially in Eastern Europe. (47) Despite 
European Banks' declared long-term commitment 
by European banks to Eastern Europe, as 
substantiated in the 'Vienna Initiative', (48) a 
strategic reorientation is also ongoing vis-à-vis 
this region. With banks freezing new lending, 
these countries are increasingly vulnerable to a 
                                                        
(44) McGuire, P. and G. von Peter (2009), ‘The US dollar 
shortage in global banking’, BIS Quarterly Review, March, 
pp 47-63; Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research (2011), 
‘Money, credit and prices in Asia’, Global Economic 
Perspectives, 3 November 2011. 
(45) European Commission (2011), ‘European Economic Forecast 
– Autumn 2011’, European Economy, Vol. 6, 2011, pp. 26-
27. 
(46) Malaysian figures tend to be inflated by the offshore business 
in Labuan. 
(47) Jenkins, P. (2011), ‘Eastern Europe has most to fear from 
banks' retreat’, Financial Times, 14 November 2011; The 
Economist (2011), ‘The euro crisis and emerging markets. 
Drought warning’, 12 November 2011. 
(48) European Commission (2011), ‘European Bank Coordination 
Vienna Initiative moves to meet new challenges’, ECFIN 
press release, 18 March 2011. 
credit crunch. This development is to a large part 
attributable to banks' current and extensive 
funding problems in a context of persistent 
tensions in euro-area sovereign debt markets. 
Policy uncertainty in some Eastern European 
countries with respect to a bank levy or the 
treatment of foreign currency loans was also not 
very helpful. High loan-to-deposit ratios and the 
net liability position of the banking sector in many 
Eastern European countries have already 
prompted several national regulators to require 
banks to curb new lending in these markets if it is 
not locally funded. (49) For Eastern Europe where 
about three quarters of the domestic banking 
system is controlled by banks mostly from 
Western Europe these prospects are particularly 
worrisome. (50) 
Large net capital inflows do not only expose 
countries to the risk of a sudden curb on lending 
and a credit crunch, but tend also to limit the 
margin for monetary policy when economies are 
overheating. Given the low interest rates and high 
liquidity provision in advanced countries capital 
flows have increasingly been channelled to 
emerging market economies. The resulting 
abundant supply of capital might fuel a credit 
bubble which eventually feeds real estate booms, 
as witnessed in China and India. Overall, many 
emerging market economies show clear signs of 
overheating which requires a more contractionary 
policy stance. However, the necessary monetary 
tightening would eventually result in even larger 
inflows. Admittedly, the ongoing global 
slowdown is likely to mitigate this policy conflict 
and support the cyclical cooling-off in emerging 
markets. 
Turning to net capital exports, several emerging 
market economies have become large creditors as 
witnessed by the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves and solid net foreign asset 
positions with an average ratio of net foreign 
assets to GDP of about 30%. (51) The net foreign 
asset position is determined by current account 
transactions (trade balance channel) but also 
subject to asset price fluctuations (valuation 
                                                        
(49) Österreichische Nationalbank (2011), ‘FMA und OeNB 
erarbeiten Maßnahmenpaket zur Stärkung der Nachhaltigkeit 
der Geschäftsmodelle österreichischer Banken’, Presse-
aussendung, 21.11.2011. 
(50) The fact that European banks must comply by mid-2012 with 
the new targets for capital ratios set by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA) might add to the pressure, at least in the 
short term. 
(51) According to World Bank data, the net foreign asset position 
of China (including Hong Kong) amounts to 63% of GDP in 
2010. Saudi Arabia and Singapore even have ratios of around 
100%. 
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channel). (52) Facing a downturn in advanced 
economies, emerging market economies might 
thus not only be affected by lower exports but 
might also see a depreciation of their asset 
holdings abroad via exchange rate reactions and 
declining bond and share prices. The resulting 
negative wealth effects can be substantial. (53) 
An additional financial transmission channel is 
associated with global equity market declines 
which could weigh on private consumption and 
investment spending via negative wealth effects 
and a higher cost of capital. In practice, asset price 
declines in advanced economies might trigger 
sell-offs of emerging market assets by advanced-
country investors.  
Stock market movements in advanced and 
emerging economies have been highly correlated 
but have tended to diverge since the beginning of 
the global recovery in spring 2009 
(Graph II.3.6). (54) Moreover, Granger causality 
tests can help to identify the predominant 
direction of causation. The tests indicate that the 
causation runs from advanced economies to 
emerging markets (Table II.3.1). The results point 
to both the US and the euro-area stock market as 
the driving forces behind equity price movements 
in emerging Asia, Latin America or Eastern 
Europe. 
Graph II.3.6: Co-movements of global stock 
market indices  
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Source: EcoWin, DataInsight. 
                                                        
(52) Lane, P. and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (2005), ‘A global 
perspective on external positions’, IMF Working Paper, 
No. 05/161, 2005. 
(53) Tille, C. (2008), ‘Financial integration and the wealth effect 
of exchange rate fluctuations’, Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp 283-294. 
(54) At this stage, the usual caveat applies that correlation is not 
causality. For example, consumer confidence in both 
advanced and emerging economies could just be hit by the 
same global shock. 
Remarkably, these findings do not change 
substantially for the 2008-09 recession period or 
for the subsequent recovery. In all three periods, 
US and euro-area markets show strong evidence 
of Granger-causing emerging stock markets. 
These one-way connections suggest in turn that a 
recession-induced stock market slump in 
advanced economies might have significant 
negative effects on the world economy as a whole. 
 
Table II.3.1: Causality test on advanced and 
emerging market stock market indices 
Jan 2006 - 
Jul 2007
Aug 2007 - 
Mar 2009
Apr 2009 - 
Oct 2011
US vs EM 0.95 0.97 0.60
EA vs EM 0.95 0.99 0.70
0.4099 0.1941 0.8077
Emerging markets do not Granger 
cause US
Euro area does not Granger cause 
emerging markets
Emerging markets do not Granger 
cause euro area
0.0013 
(reject)
US does not Granger cause emerging 
markets
Contemporaneous 
correlation
0.0000 
(reject)
0.0000 
(reject)
0.0000 
(reject)
0.45960.18340.3502
0.0384 
(reject) 0.0960
 
(1) p-values for the periods shown using daily data. 
Source: EcoWin, DataInsight, Commission calculations 
 
However, the integration of emerging market 
economies into global financial markets still 
seems to be uneven. According to a recent study 
based on an international capital asset pricing 
model, emerging financial markets overall still 
remain rather segmented from global markets and 
local risk premiums explain more than 50% of the 
total risk premium. (55) Latin America is found to 
be the relatively most integrated region in the 
global economy while, for example, emerging 
Asia lags behind. This latter result could be 
explained by the large weight of China, whose 
financial sector is still rather closed and where 
transaction volumes are relatively small. 
Confidence spillovers 
Alongside the interactions or real and financial 
linkages, the co-movement of consumer 
confidence and business sentiment is also a non-
negligible transmission channel of business cycle 
fluctuations. For example, US and euro-area 
consumer confidence indicators have been closely 
correlated over the last decade (Graph II.3.7) with 
a corresponding correlation coefficient of 0.86 for 
the period up to July 2007 and of 0.78 for the 
                                                        
(55) Guesmi, K. and D. K. Nguyen (2011), ‘How strong is the 
global integration of emerging market regions? An empirical 
assessment’, Economic Modelling, 28, 2011, p. 2517-2527. 
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period thereafter. Turning to emerging markets, 
available data suggest that the extent of co-
movement between consumer confidence in 
Brazil and China and in advanced economies has 
been increasing in recent years, but is still lower 
than among advanced countries. 
Graph II.3.7: Consumer confidence in selected 
advanced and emerging economies  
(balances in %, Jan 99-Oct 2011) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
Unlike consumer confidence, business sentiment 
and most notably purchasing manager indices 
(PMIs) in emerging markets tend to be markedly 
correlated with their counterparts from advanced 
economies. This is likely to be related to the 
prominence of cross-border supply chains in 
global industrial production. When comparing US 
and euro-area PMIs with those from Brazil, 
Russia and China, the correlation appears to have 
increased since the onset of the financial crisis. 
However, activity in the euro area has been hit 
remarkably harder than in emerging markets or 
the US most recently. 
Results from Granger causality tests between US 
and euro-area PMIs and the respective indices of 
the three emerging market countries indicate that 
industrial activity in advanced countries 
influences sentiment developments in emerging 
market and vice versa. In practice, the euro area 
PMI Granger-caused respective PMIs in Russia 
and China, with causation in the latter case also 
running in the opposite direction. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that US PMI Granger-caused its 
Brazilian and Russian counterparts but not the 
Chinese PMI index. Test suggests that causality is 
running from China to the US but not vice 
versa. (56) 
                                                        
(56) Results have to be interpreted with caution given the small 
sample size. 
Graph II.3.8: Purchasing manager indices (PMI) 
in advanced and emerging economies  
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(1) The ISM composite index is the weighted average of the ISM 
manufacturing index and the ISM non-manufacturing index, 
weighted by value added by industry. 
Source: EcoWin, Commission calculations. 
Concluding remarks  
As the advanced world is heading for a severe 
downturn, emerging market economies, which 
account for about half of global output, have still 
been growing relatively robustly. This has led 
some observers to suggest that emerging 
economies have successfully decoupled from the 
rich world and that a recession in the US or 
Europe may not have the same devastating impact 
on the world economy as in the past. While it is 
true that emerging market economies has featured 
higher trend growth rates and might continue to 
outpace their developed economy counterparts 
due to a successful catching-up process, the 
empirical evidence presented in this section 
rejects to a large extent the hypothesis of a general 
cyclical decoupling. On the contrary, business 
cycle co-movements tend to have increased 
during the last decades and appear to be most 
pronounced during recessionary periods. 
In this regard, emerging market economies 
continue to be vulnerable to a deep recession in 
advanced countries, which will directly impinge 
on world trade, whose immediate drop is further 
multiplied by the high degree of global vertical 
integration. International financial linkages 
constitute an additional contagion channel, for 
example through the high correlation of global 
stock markets or the exposure of US and 
European banks to emerging market economies. 
Emerging economies' reliance on banks from 
advanced economies remains relatively high 
although its degree varies with the regions 
concerned and is primarily high for a few Asian 
countries and Eastern Europe. The latter are 
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particularly at risk if European banks were to 
reduce their exposure in the region as part of their 
efforts to improve capital ratios. Finally, 
confidence spill-overs are increasingly seen as a 
further potential source of contagion which 
particularly applies to business sentiment. 
Although being partly protected by stronger trend 
growth emerging market economies are likely to  
be affected by a downturn in advanced 
economies. Should the current slowdown in 
advanced economies prove more persistent than 
expected or even turn into an outright recession, 
emerging market economies will hardly be left 
unscathed. 

III. Recent DG ECFIN publications 
 
- 43 - 
III.1.  Occasional Papers 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 87. October 2011. 
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Fifth review - October 2011 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp87_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 86. September 2011. 
The EU's neighbouring economies: coping with new challenges 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp86_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 85. December 2011. 
Progress towards meeting the economic criteria for accession: the assessments of the 2011 Progress 
Reports and Opinion (Serbia) 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp85_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 84. September 2011. 
Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland - Summer 2011 Review 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp84_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 83. September 2011. 
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal - First review - Summer 2011 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp83_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 82. July 2011. 
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - Fourth Review - Spring 2011 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp82_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 81. July 2011. 
2011 Economic and Fiscal Programmes of potential candidate countries: EU Commission's assessment 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp81_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 80. July 2011. 
2011 Pre-accession Economic Programmes of candidate countries: EU Commission assessment 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp80_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 79. June 2011. 
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp79_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 78. May 2011. 
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland - Spring 2011 Review 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp78_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 77. February 2011. 
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece - Third Review 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp77_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 76. February 2011. 
The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp76_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 75. February 2011. 
Capital flows to converging European economies – from boom to drought and beyond 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp75_en.pdf 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2011 
 
- 44 - 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 74. December 2010. 
Joint Report on Health Systems 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp74_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. 73. December 2010. 
Progress towards meeting the economic criteria for accession: the assessments of the 2010 Progress 
Reports and the Opinions 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp73_en.pdf 
 
III.2.  Economic Papers  
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 446. October 2011 
Lourdes Acedo Montoya and Björn Döhring 
The improbable renaissance of the Phillips curve: The crisis and the euro area inflation dynamics 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/ecp446_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 445. September 2011 
Narcissa Balta and Eric Ruscher 
Household savings and mortgage decisions: the role of the "down-payment channel" in the euro area 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/ecp445_en.htm 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 444. July 2011 
Ignazio Angeloni, Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Benjamin Carton, Zsolt Darvas, Christophe Destais, Jean Pisani-
Ferry, André Sapir, and Shahin Vallée. 
Global currencies for tomorrow: A European perspective 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp444_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 443. July 2011 
Lukas Vogel. 
Structural reforms and external rebalancing in the euro area: A model-based analysis 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp443_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 442. March 2011 
Julia Lendvai, Laurent Moulin and Alessandro Turrini. 
From CAB to CAAB? Correcting Indicators of Structural Fiscal Positions for Current Account Imbalances 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp442_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 441. March 2011 
Matteo Barigozzi, Antonio M. Conti and Matteo Luciani.  
Measuring Euro Area Monetary Policy Transmission in a Structural Dynamic Factor Model 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp441_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 440. March 2011 
Paolo A. Pesenti and Jan J.J. Groen. 
Commodity prices, commodity currencies, and global economic developments   
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp440_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 439. February 2011 
Pedro Gomes 
Fiscal policy and the labour market: the effects of public sector employment and wages 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp439_en.pdf 
 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 438. February 2011 
Jordi Suriñach, Fabio Manca and Rosina Moreno. 
Extension of the Study on the Diffusion of Innovation in the Internal Market 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp438_en.pdf 
III. Recent DG ECFIN publications 
 
- 45 - 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. 437. February 2011 
Ronald Albers and Marga Peeters. 
Food and Energy Prices, Government Subsidies and Fiscal Balances in South Mediterranean Countries  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2011/pdf/ecp437_en.pdf 
 
III.3.  Other publications 
 
European economic forecast – autumn 2011 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-6_en.pdf  
 
Tax reforms in EU Member States 2011– October 2011 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-5_en.pdf  
 
The 2012 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies – September 2011  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-4_en.pdf  
 
Interim forecast – September 2011  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/pdf/2011/2011-09-interim-forecast-
final_en.pdf  
 
European Economic forecast – spring 2011  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ec-forecast-spring2011.pdf  
 
Labour market developments in Europe, 2011 – spring 2011  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-2_en.pdf  
 
Public finances in EMU – 2011  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-3_en.pdf 
 
Convergence report 2010  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-3_en.pdf 
 
III.4.  Regular publications 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the 
European Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm  
 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early 
assessment of the cyclical situation) 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/cycle_indicators/2011/pdf/3_en.pdf 
 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/key_indicators/documents/key_indicators_en.pdf  
 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, 
the maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/bond_market/index_en.htm  
 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/competitiveness/index_en.htm  
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